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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL CULTURE, POLICY LIBERALISM, AND THE STRENGTH OF
JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE IN THE STATES
by
Casey Carmody

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013
Under the Supervision of Professor David Pritchard

This study examined the relationships between the strength of states’ journalist’s
privileges and state characteristics. The state characteristics included political culture and
policy liberalism. The study created an index to identify and score several important
components of journalist’s privilege in each state. The various components included the
legal source of the privilege, when journalists could use the privilege, what types of
information the privilege protected, and who could invoke the privilege. The study then
used statistical tests to test the relationships between state characteristics and privilege
strength. The results indicated that policy liberalism was a significant predictor of a
state’s journalist’s privilege strength. Political culture was not related to privilege
strength. In a larger context, the study’s results added evidence to a larger trend that
policy liberalism influences state media law. The results also found that several states
limited journalist’s privilege to traditional journalists. Only a small number of states
have extended the privilege to non-traditional journalists, such as Internet journalists and
book authors.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The definitions of who exactly is a journalist are a mess. Some definitions are
limited to traditional newsgatherers such as newspaper and television journalists. Others
claim that “we’re all journalists now” because technological advancements have made
self-publishing easier than ever.1 An internet search of “who is a journalist” leads down
an endless rabbit hole of debate and discussion. The idea of who qualifies as a journalist
has ranged from traditional reporters2 to lonely pamphleteers3 to online bloggers4 to
Internet publishers of classified documents5 with many definitions in between. The U.S.
Supreme Court has refused to establish a definition of a journalist on multiple occasions.6
A clear designation of who can be considered a journalist has not emerged. Granted, the
discussion is not entirely new.7 It has merely intensified in a world where publishing has
become more convenient.8
The importance of the definitions of journalists cannot be understated. In the
United States, the press has several privileges that other citizens do not enjoy. 9 One
privilege is a journalist’s privilege to keep information about sources confidential. Most

1

See SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRESS AND RESHAPING
OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE (2007).
2
STANLEY JOHNSON & JULIAN HARRISS, THE COMPLETE REPORTER 3-8 (1942).
3

See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
5
Scott Gant, “Why Julian Assange is a Journalist,” SALON, Dec. 20, 2010,
http://www.salon.com/2010/12/20/wikileaks_gant_journalism/.
6
See Branzburg, supra note 3, at 704; Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876,
927-928 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
7
See Branzburg, supra note 3, at 704.
8
See Citizens United, supra note 6; Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of
Journalism to Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
1371 (2003); Erik Ugland & Jennifer Henderson, Who is a Journalist and Why Does it Matter?
Disentangling the Legal and Ethical Arguments, 22 J. OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS 241 (2007); Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515 (2007); Sharon Docter,
Blogging and Journalism: Extending Shield Law Protection to New Media Forms, 54 J. OF BROADCASTING
& ELECTRONIC MEDIA 588 (2010).
9
GANT, supra note 1, at 87.
4
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states have enacted shield statutes to give journalists this privilege that non-journalists do
not receive. Shield statutes grant journalists a privilege from testifying about their news
sources in state courts or before state agencies.10 In several states that have not enacted
shield statutes, state courts have decided that journalists are granted immunity through
existing legislation or state constitutions.11
Many journalists argue that these privileges are essential to the free flow of
information. Journalists suggest that confidential sources of important information will
dry up if authorities require journalists to expose the sources’ identities. The result of few
sources is that less information can be given to citizens. Without information, citizens do
not have the ability to effectively participate in democracy. Therefore, many journalists
maintain that the protection of sources is crucial to a well-functioning democracy. This
concept would also suggest that states with broad protections established through shield
statutes have greater democratic participation than in states without shield statutes.
The nature of journalist’s privilege lies at the heart of this study. This study adds
to the existing literature about journalist’s privilege in several important ways. This thesis
advances theory that a particular state characteristic influences media law. It adds to
discussions about the nature of federalism through the differences in state laws. This
study contributes to the understanding of how different states protect journalists, whether
it is based on who they work for or whether the person is engaged in news gathering and
disseminating. This thesis examines the ways in which states have been willing to make

10

PAUL SIEGEL, COMMUNICATION LAW IN AMERICA 7 (2d ed. 2008).
Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress: Journalists' Privilege to Withhold Information in
Judicial and Other Proceedings: State Shield Statutes, No. RL32806 (June 27, 2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL32806.pdf.
11
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clear definitions of journalists, which can ultimately lead to more First Amendment rights
for journalists that other citizens do not receive.
A prior study into media law posited that the liberalism of a state’s policies
influences state media law.12 States with more liberal policies tend to have laws that are
more favorable to journalists. Few studies have aimed to test this theory, though. No
studies have examined whether a state’s policy liberalism can affect the law of
journalist’s privilege. Previous research on journalist’s privilege has simply focused on
press subpoenas or the textual analysis of shield statutes. This study, in contrast, uses
content analysis to identify key provisions of states’ journalist’s privilege protections.
The data are compared to specific state characteristics to see the influence on the state’s
media laws. The examination of the state characteristics and state journalist’s privilege
protections fills a gap in the literature of the understanding of the privilege.
This study’s focus on state law is important to the basic understanding of the
American system of federalism. As Justice Louis Brandeis once said, “It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.”13 It is under this theory that states have held different views on
press protection even with the First Amendment of the Constitution stating “Congress
shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”14 The Fourteenth
Amendment15 requires that states must respect the First Amendment’s guarantees at a

12

David Pritchard & Neil Nemeth, Predicting the Content of State Public Record Laws, NEWSPAPER RES.
J., Fall 1989.
13
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
14
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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minimum,16 but states can establish broader protections for the press than the First
Amendment requires. Although states take cues from one another,17 states have not
followed a particularly uniform approach to establishing shield protections for journalists.
States have independently made decisions on how to approach press privileges. This
study looks to explain whether some state characteristics explain differences in state
media law. Identifications of the characteristics also provide a framework to understand
the development of state law. Several factors can play a role in the way legislation is
developed, shaped, and passed into law. Ultimately, the study can provide more insight
into the understanding of the American federalism system.
The study is important in that it focuses on the different ways that states have
decided to provide protections to journalists. Some states provide journalist’s privilege
protections to journalists based on who is their employer. Other states provide protections
based on whether a person is involved in journalistic activities. The distinctions are very
important because of Internet self-publishing. Citizen journalists have more opportunities
than ever before to gather and disseminate news. States are beginning to grapple with the
idea that these types of journalists may deserve protections even though they do not work
for traditional media outlets.
This study’s examination of how states define journalists is crucial to the current
state of journalism. States that recognize journalist’s privilege inherently define that some
people are journalists while others are not. Such designations can be problematic.
Essentially, the clear definitions can create different levels of First Amendment privileges
for different citizens. Journalists receive more First Amendment privileges than non16

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES 3
(2007).
17

5

journalists. The problem has often been the reason that the Supreme Court is hesitant to
create a definition of journalists. The accessibility of Internet publishing only compounds
the problem. The modern-day lonely pamphleteers no longer stand on the street corner to
disseminate their message. The pamphleteers now publish online through blogs and
discussion forums. The clear-line definitions of a journalist in state law has the potential
to become troublesome when people can publish information easily online.
Overall, this study seeks to add to the discussion of whether state characteristics
influence media law. The study also looks to provide explanations of who might be
considered a journalist for the purposes of special press privileges. More specifically, the
study seeks to discover whether non-traditional journalists, such as bloggers or Internet
publishers, enjoy the privileges that state governments have granted to traditional
journalists. With the continuing advancement of Internet self-publishing and citizen
journalism, questions about who exactly is a journalist become all the more difficult.

6

Chapter 2: Literature Review
A Federalism System
State governance differs in the United States because of federalism. Federalism is
a system of government in which authority is divided among multiple realms. Each realm
maintains its own autonomy, but the possibility remains for the realms to work
cooperatively.18 In the United States, this authority is shared between the federal
government and state governments. This system of shared authority is established
through the United States Constitution, which establishes specific powers for the federal
government and reserves certain roles for the states. States are granted equal
representation in the Senate, play a prominent role in the selection of the president,
approve constitutional amendments, and have guarantees of maintaining their own
government.19
Through the maintenance of their own governments, states govern over most
Americans’ everyday activities within constitutional limits. States have the power to
regulate taxes, criminal law, education, the creation of local governments, capital
punishment, and social issues, such as gay marriage and abortion requirements.20 With
the various issues to tackle, states approach public policy from many different angles.
Unsurprisingly, laws and policies on similar issues can widely vary from state to state.
It is important to note that states do not always act independently of each other,
though. In fact, the opposite can happen. Policy diffusion occurs when state decision
makers look to other states to imitate policy innovation.21 Even with states taking cues

18

KYLE SCOTT, FEDERALISM: NORMATIVE THEORY AND ITS PRACTICAL RELEVANCE 1 (2011).
DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, FEDERALISM AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 2 (2012).
20
Id. at 31.
21
KARCH, supra note 17, at 3.
19
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from other states, variations are still likely to develop. Many factors can cause these
differences. Two particular characteristics that create these differences are political
culture and policy liberalism.
State Political Culture
In his study of American federalism, Elazar noted that states had varying political
cultures. Elazar defined political culture as “the particular pattern of orientation to
political action in which each political system is imbedded.”22 Essentially, political
culture plays a significant role in the way a state’s political system operates. Elazar
suggested that three main aspects influence a state’s political culture. The first aspect was
the perceptions of what politics is and what is expected of government. The second was
the type of people who are active in politics and serve as officials. The final aspect was
the way citizens, politicians and government officials actually take part in practicing
government according to their perceptions.23
Elazar’s examination of these characteristics led him to conclude that states can
fall into one of three distinct political cultures. Although some states had mixed cultures,
Elazar found a dominant culture in each state. The first political culture is individualistic.
In states with individualistic cultures, government is viewed in mostly economic terms.
Government must be limited and encourage private initiatives. The government also
should aim to expand access to the marketplace. The people involved in government view
politics as a way to advance both socially and economically. Party loyalty is very
important because the political system relies on mutual obligations within parties rather

22
23

DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 109 (3d ed. 1984).
Id., at 112.
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than a focus on issues. Often, government official corruption is high, but it is also widely
accepted.24
The second political culture is moralistic. In states with moralistic cultures,
politics is viewed as a way to improve society. The goal of the government is to promote
the public good. When involved with politics and government, people don’t view the
involvement as a means to advance economically. Rather, government service is viewed
as public service. Party loyalties are not strong in moralistic cultures. The importance of
issues and public good outweigh loyalties to a specific party. Politics is considered to be
the concern of every citizen. There are fewer career politicians. Political corruption is
also very low.25
The final political culture is traditionalistic. For states with traditionalistic
cultures, politics and government maintain existing societal hierarchies and structures.
Paternalism and elitism are valued in this political culture. People who serve in
government often come from the social elite or have long-standing family ties to
governing. These ties are of the utmost importance because value is placed on these ties
rather than political party allegiance. People who are not part of the existing political
system are not encouraged to become involved in politics.26
Elazar’s political culture typology has held up over time. One criticism of
Elazar’s classifications was that it did not rely on statistical procedures or empirical data
to determine his cultures.27 The critical study did find that Elazar’s typologies were as an
effective predictive tool as the study’s statistically created regional subcultures. Both

24

Id. at 115-117.
Id. at 117-118.
26
Id. at 118-119.
27
Joel Lieske, Regional Subcultures of the United States, 55 THE J. OF POL. 888, 889 (1993).
25
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cultural measures were similar in predicting habitual political behavior and political
behavior that is arranged according to state-party lines.28 Other studies have also found
that Elazar’s typologies remain an effective way to explain variations in policies among
states.29 Political culture also remains an enduring trait of states because Elazar based it
on migration patterns.30
Policy Liberalism
Distinct from political culture, policy liberalism is a state’s tendency to foster the
social and civic lives of its citizens. Liberalism should not be understood in its classical
definition. The term is used in its modern American connotation. It is a term that
describes the ideological orientations of a state’s policies. States with higher levels of
policy liberalism tend to spend more public money on social welfare programs
underprivileged residents. High policy liberalism states tend to use the government to
place more regulations on businesses than states with low levels of policy liberalism.
States with high policy liberalism also hold more expansive views on civil rights and
voter protections. It is important to note that policy liberalism is not intended to label
policies as good or bad. Rather, it is merely a descriptive term that suggests what type of
ideological viewpoints might favor the particular types of policy.

28

Id., at 908-909.
See Steven G. Koven & Christopher Mausolff, The Influence of Political Culture on State Budgets:
Another Look at Elazar’s Formulation, 32 Am. Rev. of Pub. Admin. 66, 74 (2002). A state’s budget
expenditures vary depending on its type of political culture; Lawrence M. Mead, State Political Culture
and Welfare Reform, 32 THE POL’Y. STUD. J. 271, 286 (2004). Moralistic states were most successful at
welfare reform. The author states successful reform is the process as well as a state avoiding political and
administrative problems; Patrick Fisher, State Political Culture and Support for Obama in the 2008
Democratic Presidential Primaries, 47 SOC. SCI. J. 699, 708 (2010). Political culture was correlated with
support for Barack Obama during the 2008 primaries; David A. Tandberg & Erik C. Ness, State Capital
Expenditures for Higher Education: “Where the Real Politics Happens,” 36 J. OF EDUC. FIN. 394, 411
(2011). Political culture was a significant predictor of state capital expenditures on higher education.
30
ELAZAR, supra note 22, at 122.
29
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Klingman and Lammers’ examination of several different policies indicated that
states differ in the tendency of public sector use.31 The policies they examined were
associated with liberal positions in American politics, thus creating the label of “general
policy liberalism.” Klingman and Lammers concluded that policy liberalism was an
enduring trait of states and was dependent on multiple factors. The factors include
socioeconomic and political structures of the state, the state’s society, and the state’s
political structure.32
Subsequent research on policy liberalism has indicated that it develops from
public opinion. Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s research suggested that public opinion was
the strongest indicator of state policy. They found very strong correlations between the
ideology of public opinion and the ideological approach of state policies. Erikson, Wright
and McIver also suggested that socioeconomic variables were not significantly related to
policy liberalism. They found that when public opinion was omitted from analysis,
socioeconomic factors had a significant influence.33 The likely explanation for this
finding is that public opinion is a mediator between socioeconomic variables and policy
liberalism. Subsequent research has also indicated that public opinion is more important
in predicting policy liberalism than the influence of organized interests34 or the use of
ballot initiatives.35

31

David Klingman & William W. Lammers, The ‘General Policy Liberalism’ Factor in American State
Politics, 28 AM. JOUR. OF POL. SCI. 598, 600 (1984).
32
Id., at 608.
33
ROBERT S. ERIKSON ET AL., STATEHOUSE DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN
STATES 78-86 (1993).
34
Virginia Gray et al., Public Opinion, Public Policy, and Organized Interests in the American States, 57
POL. RES. Q. 411, 419 (2004).
35
James Monogan et al., Public Opinion, Organized Interests, and Policy Congruence in Initiative and
Noninitiative U.S. States, 9 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 304, 319 (2009).
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Additionally, policy liberalism is associated with a variety of different liberal
policies. Various indicators that are not overtly ideological can include issues such as
education spending, the extension of Medicaid eligibility beyond minimal federal
regulations, and consumer protections.36 Other indicators have much clearer partisan
divides. These indicators include gun regulation, abortion issues, and tax progressivity.37
Overall, these different types of issues can be used to determine the general policy
liberalism of a state.
A Basis for Journalist’s Privilege
The underlying rationale for the First Amendment is that free expression is crucial
to a functioning democracy.38 Many journalists have maintained that the First
Amendment’s guarantees of free expression include a journalist’s privilege.39 Some First
Amendment theorists have agreed with this idea. Particularly, Vincent Blasi has
suggested that courts should recognize that the First Amendment protects journalist’s
confidential sources.
Blasi explained that First Amendment theories established three rationales to
justify the freedom of expression.40 The rationales included individual autonomy,
diversity, and self-government.41 The individual autonomy rationale suggested that an
uninhibited flow of information allowed individuals to develop personal beliefs.42 The
diversity rationale rested on the principle that diverse ideas and opinions are good for a

36

Erikson et al., supra note 33, at 75.
Gray et al., supra note 34, at 415.
38
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
39
Garland v. Torre, 259. F.2d 545 (2nd Cir. 1958).
40
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 524
(1977).
41
Id., at 524.
42
Id., at 544.
37
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society.43 The self-government rationale was based on the idea that citizens need
information to make choices about their government.44 The rationales were not
independently unique from each other.45 Each rationale also primarily focused on the
freedom of speech.
Blasi suggested that First Amendment theory should include a fourth rationale
that was specific to the press. He called the additional rationale the checking value. The
checking value is the idea that freedom of expression is crucial because it checks the
abuse of governmental power.46 Blasi argued that this rationale should create protections
specifically for the press. A strong institutional press could check the power of large
corporations and governmental institutions.47 One specific protection Blasi suggested was
the protection of newsgatherers from subpoenas requesting information about
confidential sources.48 A journalist’s sources could be the subject of punishment from the
exposed power abusers. Therefore, the checking power of the press needed to place high
value on the protection of journalists’ confidential sources who expose corruption to the
public.49
Blasi’s ideas of the value of checking the abuse of power was not new. Historic
discussions of a free press have often focused on a checking value. Andrew Hamilton,
serving as defense attorney in the famous libel case against John Peter Zenger, argued
that people had the right to expose and oppose the abuse of official power through the

43

Id., at 549-550.
Id., at 554-555.
45
Id., at 565.
46
Id., at 527.
47
Id., at 541.
48
Id., at 605.
49
Id., at 603.
44
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press.50 In his opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, James Madison argued
that the press’ role was to have a critical eye on the government.51 Alexis de Tocqueville
suggested that press freedom was the only way to protect citizens from government
agents who violated the law.52 More recent discussions of a free press have also noted a
checking function. Former Justice Potter Stewart suggested that the purpose of a
constitutional guarantee for a free press was to create a fourth branch of government. A
free press was an additional check on the three branches of government.53 Baker
suggested a free press plays an important role in checking governmental and corporate
power.54
The checking value of the press provides a strong argument for journalist’s
privilege. Confidential sources who expose the corruption of power provides information
to citizens so they can make informed decisions. In fact, the checking value of the press
was invoked in one of the press’ greatest victories at the Supreme Court. Former Justice
Hugo Black’s concurring opinion in New York Times Co. v. United States55 stated that the
press was protected specifically so it could inform citizens of government wrongdoings.56
This important role for the press should not be understated.
Journalist’s privilege can certainly have drawbacks, though. Journalist’s privilege
can create significant legal problems. The privilege can conflict with a criminal

50

See a reprint of the famous case in The Trial of John Peter Zenger, in THREE TRIALS: ZENGER,
WOODFALL & LAMBERT: 1765-1794 46 (Stephen Parks ed., 1974).
51
James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, January 7, 1800, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON (Ralph Ketcham ed. 2006).
52
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 211 (Gerald E. Bevan trans., 2003).
53
Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631, 708 (1975).
54
C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 132-134 (2002).
55
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
56
Id., at 717.
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defendant’s constitutional rights.57 The protection of confidential sources can also
prevent all of the facts coming to light in civil litigation. Journalists who invoke a
journalist’s privilege and refuse to reveal the names of confidential sources could
potentially prevent justice.58
An example of such a situation was Judith Miller’s protection of a source who
leaked the name of C.I.A. operative Valerie Plame. The confidential source, later
identified as Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, gave
Miller information about Plame as a way to strike back at Plame’s husband. Her husband
had been critical of statements that President George Bush had made about Iraq’s
attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction. The disclosure of a covert C.I.A.
operative is a violation of federal law. When Miller was called to testify before a federal
grand jury, she refused to provide information. As a result, she was found in contempt
and jailed. Miller appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit refused to
grant Miller’s release. Eventually, Libby released Miller from their confidentiality
agreement. Miller testified before the grand jury after spending 85 days in jail.59
Although Miller’s source was eventually identified, the case highlighted multiple
problems that could arise when a journalist refuses to identify a confidential source. The
revelation of Plame’s status as an undercover operative could have put her and perhaps
other C.I.A. operatives in danger. The government was delayed from moving forward
with an investigation into a clear violation of law. Plame was prevented from learning
who derailed her career. The fact that Miller refused to name her source for so long also
57

See generally David N. Edelstein and Robert P. LoBue, Journalist’s Privilege and the Criminal
Defendant, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 913 (1979).
58
Randall D. Eliason, The Problems with Reporter’s Privilege, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1341, 1375 (2008).
59
For a more detailed account of the Miller affair, see Jill Lapotsky, Protecting the Cloak and Dagger with
an Illusory Shield: How the Proposed Free Flow of Information Act Falls Short, 62 FED. COMM. L. J., 403,
415-419 (2010).
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did not result in a free flow of information. Rather, Miller’s belief in journalist’s privilege
hindered the public from learning which government official was unlawfully releasing
information.60 Journalists often laud the protection of confidential sources as noble. In
reality, a journalist’s protection of a source can have several negative consequences.
Journalists and Confidential Sources
Journalists use sources, people with direct knowledge of the information being
reported, to provide insight on subjects.61 Effective journalism practice typically requires
a reporter to fully disclose the name and pertinent information about a source. Full
disclosure makes a journalist’s reporting reliable, believable and verifiable.62 At times,
though, some sources will only provide information if journalists make a promise of
confidentiality.63 Journalists will make such a promise so that more information can be
provided to citizens.64
Confidential sources come in several different types. Accusers hide behind the
cloak of confidentiality to make accusations about another person. Tipsters direct
journalists to important, unknown information. The stigmatized sources could face public
ridicule because they reveal potentially embarrassing information about themselves.
Explainers provide background information about the inner-workings of government or
corporations. Informants expose governmental and corporate abuses of power. Typically,
the informant is the type of source that a journalist’s privilege aims to protect. As Blasi

60

Eliason, supra note 58, at 1375-1378.
JAMES W. KERSHNER, THE ELEMENTS OF NEWS WRITING 48 (2005).
62
HOWARD C. HEYN & WARREN J. BRIER, WRITING FOR NEWSPAPERS AND NEWS SERVICES 48 (1969).
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suggested, confidential sources who expose the abuse of power are the people that need
the most protection.65
Unsurprisingly, surveys have shown journalists most often use confidential
sources to report on governmental affairs, crime and politics.66 Although state and federal
whistleblower statutes provide some protection, government officials can still threaten
sources. This situation is especially evident with White House administrations increasing
the use of the Espionage Act to prosecute information leaks.67 The federal and state
governments have increased the use of subpoenas to gain information from news
organizations in both criminal and civil proceedings.68 These governments have also
increased the number of subpoenas seeking information that journalists gained from
sources in confidence.69
The use of confidential sources is widespread, although it appears to be declining.
A 1971 survey of journalists indicated that journalists relied on confidential sources in
about 20 percent of stories. The survey also found that more experienced journalists used
confidential sources more frequently.70 A survey of Florida journalists found that the use
of confidential sources had declined over the ten years from 1974 to 1984.71 A survey of
Pulitzer Prize winners indicated they used some type of confidential information in about
30 percent of their stories during the same time period, though.72 An additional survey of
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300 television and newspaper journalists indicated that 76 percent believed the use of
confidential sources was essential to reporting some of their stories.73
Overall, journalists also do not take the use of confidential sources lightly. Most
journalists are dedicated to protecting their sources. Surveys of journalists in 1982, 1992,
and 2002, found that less than 10 percent of journalists believed that there was
justification for agreeing to protect confidentiality and not doing so.74
A 1996 survey of editors at 64 large-circulation American daily newspapers found
that 92 percent allowed the use of confidential sources.75 Even though using confidential
sources was widespread, editors allowed journalists to use these sources only with
discretion. Nearly all surveyed editors allowed the use of confidential sources only as a
last resort to gain information. About 80 percent of the editors said confidential sources
must be described in as much detail as possible in a story. More than three-fourths of
editors required reporters to disclose names of confidential sources to them. A similar
proportion of papers required additional verification steps of the confidential source’s
information.76
The use of confidential sources has benefits. One study found that stories with
confidential sources were more critical than other stories. The research suggested that
confidential sources lead to greater diversity of viewpoints and criticism of those in
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power. The author suggested that this diversity and criticism has civic value.77 Sources
could also be more willing to publicly share information when a journalist promises
confidentiality. The ability to grant confidentiality to a source allows journalists to
present a richer understanding to citizens. Journalists can then provide a more accurate
picture of reality to the public.78
Journalists’ use of unnamed sources has significant pitfalls, though. Readers view
stories without named sources as less credible.79 Sources who are granted confidentiality
also could feel free to say whatever they want without feeling accountable for their
statements.80 In the most alarming situations, journalists can completely fabricate
information and then claim that it came from confidential sources. One high profile
example of this was former Washington Post reporter Janet Cooke’s story about
“Jimmy,” an 8-year-old heroin addict. Cooke convinced her editors that she could not
reveal the identity of Jimmy because of promises of confidentiality. The revelation that
the story was fabricated came out after Cooke had won a Pulitzer Prize.81
The Historical Development of Journalist’s Privilege
Journalistic protections of confidential information can be found as early as
colonial times in America. Shepard suggested that the duty to protect confidential
identities started with colonial publishers who kept the names of their anonymous writers
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confidential.82 Particularly, the early cases of jailed publishers James Franklin and John
Peter Zenger set the foundation for such protection.83 James Franklin began publishing
the New-England Courant in 1721. The Courant made a habit of criticizing both public
and religious officials.84 The Courant used writers who had pseudonyms or were
anonymous. The Courant’s criticisms often resulted in Franklin being the subject of local
government’s ire. Unsurprisingly, Franklin was jailed several times but did not reveal the
names of the different writers.85
In 1734, Zenger, publisher of the New York Weekly Journal, ran into trouble when
he published a series of critical articles about Governor William Cosby. Unappreciative
of the criticism, Cosby ordered Zenger to be arrested and charged with seditious libel.
The jailed Zenger refused to reveal the names of people who had written the offensive
articles.86 Zenger was eventually acquitted of the charges after his lawyer, Andrew
Hamilton, convinced a jury that the truth could not be libelous. Although the case focused
on libel, Shepard pointed out that Hamilton addressed the idea of confidentiality.
Hamilton maintained that Zenger’s protection of the authors’ identities was rooted in the
right of speaking and writing to oppose unrestrained power.87
Granted, neither of these publishers held the conception of a privilege that many
journalists hold today. Rather, both publishers placed high value on anonymous speech.
The publishers protected the writers of news stories, which Shepard suggested is not
dissimilar from contemporary journalists’ arguments to protect information about
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sources.88 Modern journalists argue that many sources need assurances of confidentiality.
Any revelation of a source’s identity might lead to some form of punishment. Both
Franklin’s and Zenger’s anonymous writers could have faced sanctions if the government
knew their identities.
During the 19th and 20th centuries, journalism continued to develop. The 19th
century saw the rise of modern conceptions of journalism through the penny press.89
Newspapers changed from being the mouthpieces of political parties to objective
purveyors of truth. Journalism also began its professionalization process in the early 20th
century. The process resulted in universities creating journalism programs, journalists
stating their importance to the public, the creation of professional organizations, and the
development of journalistic codes of ethics.90
During the 1800s and early 1900s, journalist’s privilege also developed. The 19th
century saw multiple examples of journalist being jailed for refusing to disclose the
names of confidential sources.91 In 1848, the United States Senate held New York Herald
journalist John Nugent in a committee room for a month. Nugent refused to identify who
gave him information about a secret treaty to end the United States’ war with Mexico.92
James W. Simonton of the New York Daily Times was jailed in 1857 for refusing to
disclose who gave him information about land speculators giving bribes to U.S.
representatives.93 Journalists Elisha J. Edwards and John S. Shriver found themselves in
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jail after they refused to reveal their sources of information about senators receiving
bribes from the sugar industry.94 The 20th century also had several instances of
journalist’s privilege cases. State and federal appellate courts had addressed issues of
journalist’s privilege in nine criminal cases between 1900 and 1960.95 Journalists lost all
decisions on the privilege during that time span, even in states that had enacted a shield
statute.96
During the 19th and early 20th century, journalist’s used different justifications
for concealing the identities of their sources. Journalists argued that they would lose the
ability to effectively do their jobs if the government required the disclosure of
confidential sources’ names.97 Journalists invoked constitutional rights against selfincrimination.98 Journalistic codes of ethics also began to allude to the idea that
journalist’s had a duty to protect sources. By the 1940s, many ethical codes specifically
addressed the protection of confidential sources. 99 In fact, codes of ethics continue to
state the importance of journalists keeping promises of confidentiality.100 All of these
arguments rose out of the idea that journalists were professionals. As professionals,
journalists needed to distinguish themselves from other citizens. The argument that
journalists should not be required to testify about sources was one way in which they
could set themselves apart from the general populace.
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In the middle of the 20th century, journalists began making a new argument in
courts of the basis for a privilege. The advancement came in 1958 when a reporter made
the argument that the First Amendment provided journalists a testimonial privilege to
protect sources.101 Garland v. Torre102 was a libel case in which actress Judy Garland
sought the name of a person who made defamatory comments about her in a New York
Herald Tribune article. Marie Torre, the author of the article, refused to reveal the name
of her source because she had promised confidentiality. The trial court held Torre in
contempt for her refusal to identify the source. She appealed the decision to the United
States Second Circuit of Appeals. In her appeal, Torre claimed that the First Amendment
granted journalists a right to protect confidential sources.103
Justice Potter Stewart, before his appointment to the United States Supreme
Court, wrote the opinion for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In the opinion, the
court rejected Torre’s First Amendment claims. The court acknowledged that the required
disclosure of a journalist’s sources could potentially abridge press freedom. The court
stated that the freedom of the press was not absolute, though. The rights of the press must
be balanced against the need of the courts to discover truth.104 Stewart explained that
Garland’s request for the name of Torre’s source was directly relevant to the case.
Stewart also noted that Garland had exhausted all other means to learn the name of the
source before she requested the information from Torre. Thus, Torre was obligated to
reveal the information.105 Torre appealed the decision to the United States Supreme
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Court, but the Court declined to hear the case.106 Ultimately, Torre spent 10 days in
jail.107 She never revealed her source to anyone, including her family.108
Garland v. Torre was a significant move forward for journalist’s privilege. Prior
to the case, journalists had not argued in court that the First Amendment provided
journalists the ability to protect sources. Despite Torre’s lack of success, other journalists
began making similar arguments. Some journalists were even successful in their cases.109
Over time, state and federal courts began to take different approaches on whether the
First Amendment provided a journalist’s privilege. The United States Supreme Court
needed to determine whether the privilege could be found in the Constitution.
Branzburg v. Hayes
The only time the United States Supreme Court has addressed whether the First
Amendment grants a journalist’s privilege was in Branzburg v. Hayes.110 The case
consolidated four cases from lower courts. Two involved Paul Branzburg, a Kentucky
journalist, who had written stories about drug use in Jefferson and Franklin counties. In
both cases, a grand jury ordered Branzburg to appear and answer questions about the
sources of his stories. Branzburg refused to answer maintaining he had a First
Amendment privilege to protect the confidentiality of his sources. The Kentucky
appellate courts decided that Branzburg did not have such a privilege.111
The third case focused on news coverage of the Black Panthers. The Black
Panther party in New Bedford, Massachusetts, allowed journalist Paul Pappas into the
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group’s headquarters to report on an expected police raid. The condition of entry was
premised on Pappas’ agreement to not disclose anything he saw or heard other than the
raid. The raid never occurred. As a result, Pappas did not write a story about what had
happened inside the headquarters. Nonetheless, a Bristol county grand jury subpoenaed
Pappas. Pappas attempted to have a court dismiss the subpoena on First Amendment
grounds without success. Eventually, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the
First Amendment did not grant journalists a testimonial privilege.112
The final case also involved coverage of the Black Panthers. Earl Caldwell was a
New York Times reporter assigned to cover various black militant groups. A federal grand
jury ordered Caldwell to testify about information on the Black Panthers he obtained in
various interviews. Caldwell and the Times moved to dismiss the subpoena, stating that
the mere appearance before a grand jury would hinder his ability to work with sources in
the different groups. A court denied the motion to dismiss. Caldwell still refused to
appear, which led to a court finding him in contempt. Eventually, the United States Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the First Amendment did provide a qualified
testimonial privilege to protect sources.113
After hearing the consolidated cases, the Supreme Court determined that the First
Amendment did not empower journalists to defy grand juries. Justice Byron White wrote
the opinion for the five justice majority. The court held that the Constitution provided a
testimonial privilege only against self-incrimination through the Fifth Amendment. The
First Amendment did not provide a similar privilege.114 White’s opinion also stated that
the court was hesitant to grant such a privilege because of the inherent problems in
112
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defining journalists. The First Amendment did not simply protect professional journalists.
The idea of who was a journalist was far more encompassing.115 White’s opinion was
limited, though. He stated that state courts had the ability to read their state constitutions
in a way that provided a journalist’s privilege. Also, state legislatures were free to enact
statutes that granted journalists a testimonial privilege.116
Justice Lewis Powell wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Powell’s opinion has
provided the basis for important interpretations of Branzburg. He stated that journalists
could use the court system if they believed the government was harassing them. Justice
Powell believed that courts needed to take a case-by-case approach to balancing press
freedoms and the need for journalists’ testimony. His opinion suggested that courts
should compel a journalist’s testimony only when the information was relevant to the
case at hand.117
The decision prompted two dissenting opinions. Justice William Douglas
dissented because of his belief that the First Amendment was absolute. On those grounds,
a journalist did not have to testify.118 He was concerned that journalists’ sources would be
reluctant to provide important information. The majority’s decision could also lead to
journalists becoming hesitant to write about particular topics.119 Justice Potter Stewart
wrote the other dissenting opinion. Justice Stewart’s dissent indicated that he believed the
First Amendment did provide a qualified privilege for journalists. His opinion laid out a
three-part test that the government must meet before a journalist could be required to
disclose a confidential source. The test required the government to show that a
115
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journalist’s testimony was relevant, unavailable through other means, and the government
had a compelling need for the information. Upon such a showing, a court could require a
journalist to testify. 120
Over time, both Justice Powell’s and Justice Stewart’s opinions have been
significant. After Branzburg, Caldwell’s attorney, James Goodale, made the case that
Justice Powell’s opinion created a plurality decision. He suggested that the concurring
opinion recognized that situations could occur when journalists would not be required to
provide testimony.121 Justice Powell’s decision also highlighted that the government did
not have an absolute right to require a journalist’s testimony. If the government has only
a qualified right to obtain testimony, Goodale reasoned, then journalists must have a
qualified privilege to withhold testimony.122 Unsurprisingly, this type of thinking has
caused many state and federal courts to recognize a First Amendment privilege in the
Branzburg decision.123 Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion has become critical because
many judges have adopted the three-part test he laid out to balance journalist’s rights with
a court’s search for truth.124
Shield Statutes, Journalist’s Privilege, and the States
It is important to note the conceptual distinction between journalist’s privilege
and shield statutes. Journalist’s privilege is a testimonial privilege that courts typically
find in common law or constitutional law. A person who is allowed to invoke a
testimonial privilege can refuse to provide information or testimony that could be
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relevant to a trial, hearing, or proceeding. Testimonial privileges typically conflict with
the discovery of truth. Therefore, privileges are rare exceptions to rules that require
testimony.125 Privileges are typically discouraged unless certain conditions are met.126
Conceptually different, shield statutes grant journalists a testimonial privilege in some
form.127 Essentially, all shield statutes are a type of journalist’s privilege, but not all
forms of journalist’s privilege are shield statutes.
Federally, no shield legislation has been passed, but it has been considered. The
first significant push for a federal shield law came immediately after the decision of
Branzburg in 1972.128 In the six years following Branzburg, Congress made several
attempts to pass federal shield legislation. The proposals failed primarily because
supporters could not agree on the definition of journalist and press groups’ demands for
an absolute privilege.129 During the 2000s, several high profile cases of journalists
spending time in jail for refusing to reveal confidential sources have encouraged
Congress to reconsider a federal shield law.130 More recently, controversies surrounding
the United States Justice Department’s use of subpoenas to obtain the phone records of
Associated Press journalists have reinvigorated a push for the law.131 The Free Flow of
Information Act132 has had some support in Congress over time, but the proposed shield
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law has consistently failed to gain full approval.133 Controversies surrounding
WikiLeaks’ disclosure of highly classified government information in 2010 have
previously weakened the case for the legislation.134
At the state level, thirty-nine states have adopted shield statutes to protect
journalists. 135 In other states, court opinions have provided journalists with shield
protection.136 States vary in the types of protection provided to journalists. States differ in
who is eligible for protection as well as what situations allow journalists to have
protection. Some states provide absolute testimonial privileges to journalists. Other states
allow the privilege to be overcome if a party seeking information can meet particular
conditions.137 States have developed differing views as to whether non-confidential
information fell under journalist’s privilege.138 Overall, states have not taken a uniform
approach to establish a journalist’s privilege.
Empirical Approaches to Analyzing Law
A call for the use of social science techniques to study media law came from
Cohen and Gleason. They suggested that communication scholars should not use the
same tools as legal scholars to study media law. Rather, communication scholars should
133
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use the tools of communication research to develop additional perspectives on law.139
Several scholars have used this type of approach to study variations in media law among
states.
Hale attempted to find correlations in an ambitious study of legal press rights in
states and categories of state characteristics. He identified 43 variables that fell into five
broad categories including media, political, economic, sociological and cultural
characteristics.140 His results indicated that only 25 of the 344 correlations were
significant.141 Of the correlations that were significant, most fell within the state’s social
characteristics. Characteristics such as population size, suburbanism and concentrations
of population in a central city were positively correlated with laws protecting the press
and access to government information.142 Political and economic characteristics provided
few correlations, though.143 Hale concluded that many press law provisions were
independent of state characteristics.144 The conclusion may have been a result of Hale’s
lack of precision in measuring press law provisions and state characteristics rather than a
lack of a state’s characteristics in affecting press law.
Other studies have focused on particular laws affecting the press. Pritchard and
Nemeth compared state characteristics, specifically policy liberalism and political
culture, to the content of the state’s public records laws. Their findings indicated that
states with higher levels of policy liberalism tended to have more open public record
laws. Political culture was not associated with the openness of the state laws, though.145
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The results of the study suggested that particular state characteristics influenced laws
within a state. If state characteristics influenced one specific type of law, such as public
records laws, these characteristics could affect other state media laws.
Pajari compared the relative openness of a state’s open records and meeting laws
to state characteristics, such as demographics, political culture and regionalism.146 He
used content analysis to classify the openness of the law and then made comparisons.
Pajari’s findings suggested that states with broader sunshine laws tended to have lower
per capita incomes, smaller amounts of public education funding and economic systems
that were not heavily based on manufacturing. States with open laws tended to be located
in the South and Mountain West regions of the United States.147 Pajari also found that
states with a moralistic political culture tended to have narrow sunshine laws. The
relationship between moralistic culture and open records laws was weak, though.148
Pajari concluded that several sweeping changes in these regions, such as civil rights
legislation and economic development, impacted the development of the laws.149 This
study’s findings suggested that significant changes to state characteristics, such as the
civil rights movement in the south, influenced the make-up of a state’s laws.
Some additional studies have provided a basis for comparing state media laws.
Hale and Scott examined the impact of the Minnesota News Council on libel litigation.
The Minnesota News Council was designed to hear complaints about the accuracy and
fairness of Minnesota’s news media. Many complaints involved alleged reputational
damages. The researchers hypothesized that the presence of the council would slow the
146
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rate of libel suits involving mass media compared to Minnesota’s bordering states. Their
findings supported the hypothesis. The rate of libel litigation involving mass media was
indeed lower in Minnesota than in surrounding states.150 Their findings indicated that
even small changes in state characteristics can have impacts on the law between states.
Hale conducted an additional study that compared the impact of state prohibitions
of punitive damages on libel litigation. Hale compared the number of libel litigation
appeals involving mass media organizations in five states allowing punitive damages and
five states that did not. His findings indicated that the number of appeals was similar in
states that did and did not allow punitive damages. The average amount of damages
awarded was also similar in both types of states.151 Hale’s methodological approach
provided alternative insight to defamation law. His findings seem to challenge common
thought that plaintiffs and lawyers are more likely to aggressively pursue libel litigation
in states allowing opportunities to collect larger amounts of damages. The study also
focused on the effects that legal differences between states could potentially have on
media law.
Few studies have used empirical methods to analyze the law of journalist’s
privilege. Most studies on the subject have focused on journalists’ use of confidential
sources. Many of the studies have examined the effect of subpoenas on journalistic
activity. Blasi surveyed journalists on the use of confidential sources and the effects of
court subpoenas to testify. Blasi’s findings indicated that journalists typically used
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confidential sources to verify information that they already have.152 Reporters believed
that subpoena threats made interpretive reporting more difficult.153 The surveyed
journalists also expressed that ethical obligations to sources should be determined
personally rather than in a court.154 Blasi’s findings also indicated that only 35 percent of
journalists were certain whether their state had a shield law.155 His study was a precursor
to his further studies on press subpoenas.156 Osborn also conducted a survey of journalists
to measure the effects of subpoenas on the use of confidential sources. His findings
suggested that journalists still used confidential sources despite the threat of
subpoenas.157 St. Dizier surveyed Florida reporters to examine whether they used sources
differently after the Branzburg decision and Janet Cooke scandal. His findings indicated
that journalists used confidential sources less frequently and more cautiously.158
In a study similar to Blasi’s study on the impact of subpoenas, Jones conducted a
survey of more than 750 daily newspaper editors and television station news directors
affiliated with ABC, NBC, CBS and FOX.159 Among other items, the survey measured
newsroom leaders’ knowledge of possible protections from subpoenas, such as shield
statutes and case law. The results indicated that approximately 20 percent of editors and
news directors were not sure whether their state had a shield statute. The results also
indicated that news leaders in states with a court-made journalist’s privilege were less
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likely to be aware of protections.160 Jones suggested that some media members are
confused about legal protections in their state. Particularly, smaller news organizations
tend to be the most misinformed about journalist’s privilege.161 Jones’ study provided
insight into news leaders understanding of journalist’s privilege. Unfortunately, it does
not provide much information on the law itself.
A 2005 University of Connecticut survey focused on the opinions of the public
and journalists. The findings indicated that 87 percent of journalists supported the
passage of a federal shield law. The results also suggested that 55 percent of the
American public support federal shield legislation for journalists.162 A 2001 Reporters
Committee for the Freedom of the Press (RCFP) survey of journalists about subpoenas
suggested some unusual results. In states with shield statutes, news organizations
received an average of 3.1 subpoenas per news outlet. News organizations located in
states without a shield statute reported receiving an average of 1.7 subpoenas per outlet.
These results were similar to previous RCFP surveys that indicated news organizations in
states with shield statutes received, on average, more subpoenas than organizations in
non-shield statute states.163 This finding suggested that one potential reason for the
development of a state shield statute could be the number of subpoenas news
organizations received. The study also found that news organizations were more likely to
have a court dismiss a subpoena in states with shield statutes. News organizations in
states with shield statutes reported they were able to quash subpoenas 22 percent of the
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time.164 The results could indicate that investigators, courts, or parties to litigation are
issuing subpoenas to journalists only when the shield could likely be overcome. Granted,
the rate did seem low, but it was higher than the five percent of subpoenas dismissed in
non-shield statute states.165
One study has focused on an analysis of the content of shield statutes.166
Alexander and Cooper conducted a textual analysis of state shield statutes to determine
each statute’s relative strength. They judged the statutes based on who was protected,
what was protected, when protections apply and whether the privilege had qualifications.
The results indicated that many of the state statutes protected similar people and
industries. Nearly all newspaper and broadcast outlet employees were protected.
Additionally, all state statutes explicitly protected confidential sources. The states did
vary what non-traditional journalists might receive protection, though. The states also
varied in whether the statutes provided an absolute or qualified privilege. States had
several different qualifications that could override a journalist’s privilege.167 Overall, this
study provided different insight from other studies because it examined the text of
individual statutes. Unfortunately, the researchers did not examine any relevant court
decisions on journalist’s privilege. The court opinions could establish how journalist’s
privilege was actually interpreted in the state. The study did not account for how the laws
actually behaved because it did not examine court opinions. Several states were also not
considered for study because the journalist’s privilege had not been written into law.
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The previous studies, while informative, provided very little information on the
law of journalist’s privilege. In fact, most of the studies focused on ways that the
privilege was related to subpoenas. The studies also tended to focus on the perceptions of
journalists and editors. The study that focused on the text of shield statutes failed to
consider the influence court decisions can have on the interpretation of law. Additionally,
the study did not provide any comparison to state characteristics that potentially
influenced the development of a state’s shield statute. Thus, there is a major gap of
knowledge on what state factors can influence the development of states’ journalist’s
privilege.
Hypotheses
The variation of shield protections from state to state leads to the question this
thesis will focus on. What characteristics influence the breadth of shield protections in the
states? States differ in many ways, but two particular ways in which states can vary are in
political culture and policy liberalism. Political culture influences citizen’s views of
government political participation,168 so policies shaping the flow of information could
also be influenced. Specifically, moralistic political cultures encourage citizens to
participate in government. A way to involve people in political participation is to develop
a setting with a free flow of information. Moralistic states may recognize that journalist’s
privilege protections could provide a more open setting for producing information, thus:
H1: States with moralistic political cultures will provide a broader testimonial
privilege for journalists than states with traditionalistic or individualistic
cultures.
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Policy liberalism has wide-ranging implications for how laws and policies are shaped in a
particular state. Shield protections are not likely immune from this influence. Typically,
journalists favor legislation that grants more rights for and fewer restrictions on the press.
States with higher levels of policy liberalism may tend to have more expansive views of
protection for journalists, therefore:
H2: States with higher scores of policy liberalism will provide a broader
testimonial privilege for journalists than those states with lower scores.
Figure 2-1: Concepts and hypothesized influence
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Chapter 3: Methods
Methodological Approach
This research focused on journalist’s privilege as recognized in state constitutions,
statutes and state appellate court decisions. Specifically, the goal was to identify whether
certain state characteristics influence how broadly a state recognizes journalist’s
privilege. The units of analysis for the study were states. The units of observation were
state constitutions, statutes and relevant state appellate court decisions as well as
indicators of political culture and policy liberalism.
The method for the study was content analysis. Content analysis is the systematic
analysis of recorded communication.169 An advantage of this method is that it can turn
significant amounts of complicated raw data into a standardized arrangement. The
advantage was particularly useful in this study because of the various and complex ways
states have recognized journalist’s privilege. Content analysis is also useful because the
data are quantified. The quantified data are beneficial because comparison and analysis
with other quantified data become very easy.
Although the standardization of data is advantageous, it comes at a price. One
disadvantage of content analysis is that detail can be lost. This fact is especially important
because legal analysis relies on interpretations, context, and the interaction of law.
Content analysis of laws and court opinions cannot always account for these factors.170
Another disadvantage is that content analysis can prevent research from obtaining a high
level of validity. It is possible that I overlooked important provisions of journalist’s
privilege. To counteract this problem, I identified and classified as many provisions of
169
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journalist’s privilege as possible. Also, the study examined both shield statutes and state
appellate court opinions about journalist’s privilege to capture more detail.
Another method this study could have used was textual analysis. Textual analysis
is similar to content analysis in that both methods examine recorded communication.
Textual analysis, which uses a qualitative approach, aims to provide an understanding of
the meaning behind texts. Most legal analysis takes this approach. Although this method
provides a deeper understanding of the law, the study’s goal was not designed to
specifically understand what the law meant. Rather, the study focused on what specific
state characteristics can predict the breadth of journalist’s privilege. Textual analysis
would not produce the proper data to make relevant comparisons.
Data Collection
As noted previously, state statutes, constitutions, and state appellate court
decisions shape journalist’s privilege. I compiled a variety of information to understand
any given state’s breadth of journalist’s privilege. I identified state shield statutes in
several ways. Websites such as the First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University171
and the Digital Media Law Project172 have compiled lists of state shield statutes. I used
the lists to identify the 39 different shield statutes. I then viewed the full text of the
statutes in LexisNexis. I used several sources to identify state appellate court decisions
that focused on journalist’s privilege. Primarily, Westlaw’s Key Number Digest database
found most opinions.173 The Media Law Resource Center’s Media Libel Law guide174 and
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the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press’ reporter’s privilege compendium175
provided additional references for state appellate court decisions.
I excluded state trial court opinions primarily for two reasons. First, state trial
court decisions rarely appear in standard case law reporters. As a result, a significant
number of trial court decisions were unavailable. Second, a trial court’s decision is not
binding upon higher courts within a state. Therefore, the influence of trial court decisions
is limited.
The study limited the analysis to state appellate court decisions from 1964
through 2012. The concept of journalist’s privilege certainly extends well beyond the
previous five decades. Journalism law markedly changed, with New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan176 in 1964, though.177 The Sullivan decision ushered in a new wave of First
Amendment understanding. This change shaped the modern forms of media law.
Index of Shield Breadth
I created an index to create a score for the breadth of journalist’s privilege in each
state. The index allowed for a comparison between state characteristics and a journalist’s
privilege in states. The index provided equal weight to each factor of law. States that had
more factors providing journalist’s privilege indicated broader protection.
I used existing literature178 and state statutes to identify several key factors of the
journalist’s privilege index. Multiple categories made up a state’s journalist’s privilege.

Expression and Press, Press in General; Disclosure of Sources), and 311Hk404 (Privileged
Communications and Confidentiality; Other Privileges; Journalists).
174
MEDIA LIBEL LAW 2009-2010: REPORTS FROM ALL FIFTY STATES, THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
U.S. TERRITORIES, CANADA, AND ENGLAND (Media Law Resource Center, Inc. ed., 2010).
175
See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The Reporter’s Privilege, available at
http://www.rcfp.org/reporters-privilege (last visited July 4, 2013).
176
Sullivan, supra note 38.
177
See generally Anthony Lewis, MAKE NO LAW (1991).
178
Alexander & Cooper, supra note 175, at 51-71; Cong. Research Serv., supra note 11.

40

Each category had several different provisions. The first category was the source of
protection. States have found a basis for journalist’s privilege in several different ways.
States have enacted statutes that create a testimonial privilege. States could base the
protection in state constitutions through amendments or court opinions. State appellate
courts have also found a basis for journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment. Another
source for journalist’s privilege also came from the judge-created common law.
Each source for journalist’s privilege had advantages and disadvantages. Shield
statutes and amended constitutions provided specific language of the types of protections.
Specific language gave journalists a relatively clear idea of whether certain types of
information could be protected. Courts were often reluctant to interpret statutes in ways
that are outside the plain meaning of a statute, though. Therefore, a shield statute could be
limiting at times. A journalist’s privilege based in court opinions could potentially be
more dynamic. Courts have the ability to be flexible. Courts could continue to broaden
protections for journalists in states without a privilege. The disadvantage of a privilege
based in court opinions was that some decisions were later overruled. Courts that once
provided broad protections could certainly narrow the privilege in the future.
The second category was the scope of journalist’s privilege. States with a broader
privilege recognized that journalists protected information other than a confidential
source. Additional materials included unpublished information such as notes, drafts,
unused footage, tape recordings, and photographs. States that protected these types of
materials, even if they did not identify a confidential source, had a broader privilege. In
some states, the privilege only applies if journalists made an explicit promise of
confidentiality to a source. States with a broader privilege provided protection for sources
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regardless of confidentiality. Finally, some states granted protection for a journalist’s
eyewitness observations. States that protected such observations had a broader privilege.
The third category was the different contexts in which journalists could invoke the
privilege. States that grant broad protections protect in several different situations.
Journalists receive subpoenas that request information in a variety of settings.
Investigators or investigative bodies, such as grand juries, have requested information
from journalists. Legislative bodies have called upon journalists to reveal information.
Criminal defendants asked for information to aid in their defense. Parties in civil
litigation attempted to require testimony from non-party journalists. Libel plaintiffs
sought the names of confidential sources to pursue legal action. States with a broader
privilege provided protection in more of these contexts. The type of protection was also
important. An absolute privilege provided more protection than a privilege that could be
overturned under certain circumstances. States with broader privileges granted an
absolute privilege in more contexts. Additionally, some states provided a qualified
privilege. Any form of a privilege was stronger than no privilege at all.
The final category was based on who was eligible to invoke the privilege. States
with a broader privilege allowed for shield protections to extend to people besides
traditional media. Traditional journalists are not the only people who use confidential
sources while engaged in journalistic activities. Freelance journalists, authors, bloggers,
academics, students, documentarians and issue activists have used confidential sources to
gather information. These types of people gathered information with the specific intent to
disseminate and publish. States with broader protections extended privileges to more
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kinds of information gatherers and disseminators. States that had a narrow privilege
protected only journalists associated with traditional news organizations.
Coding and Analysis
The coding varied slightly depending on the information. I coded both the source
of journalist’s privilege and who could invoke the privilege as either a 2 or 0 for yes or
no, respectively. I coded the scope of a state’s privilege as a 2, 1, or 0. A 2 meant that the
type of information was protected. A 1 meant some types of the information could be
protected. A 0 meant that the information was not protected. I also coded the context in
which the privilege applied as a 2, 1, or 0. A 2 meant that journalists had an absolute
privilege in that type of setting. A 1 meant that journalists had a qualified privilege in that
type of setting. A 0 meant journalist’s privilege was not available in that setting. Upon
completion of the state’s coding, I summed the state’s coded numbers to create a final
score for a state’s journalist’s privilege shield strength.179
Once in numerical form, the breadth of journalist’s privilege was compared to
state characteristics. The two characteristics for comparison were policy liberalism and
political culture. Policy liberalism had four scores. The first score was Klingman and
Lammers’ measure of states’ general policy liberalism. Klingman and Lammers used six
variables to develop a state’s score.180 The variables represented a range of expenditurebased and non-fiscal policy. The measures were based on data that ranged from 1961 to
1977. The second score was Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s score of composite policy
liberalism. The scores were based on eight different variables.181 The variables were
based primarily on non-fiscal policy areas. The data for the variables represented a state’s
179
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policy liberalism around 1980. The third and fourth scores were Sorens, Muedini, and
Ruger’s scores of state policy liberalism. The scores were based on more than 170
different state and local policies.182 The variables included both fiscal and non-fiscal state
policies. The 2008 score represented a state’s policy liberalism as of December 31, 2008.
The 2010 score represented a state’s policy liberalism as of December 31, 2010.
Table 3-1 reports the policy liberalism scores. The Policy Liberalism Score (1984)
indicated the Klingman and Lammers state factor scores of general policy liberalism in
the second column.183 The scores ranged from -2.061 to 1.862. The higher state scores
represented higher levels of policy liberalism. Negative scores indicated a state’s
tendency to adopt conservative-oriented policies. The Policy Liberalism Score (1993)
indicated the Erikson, Wright, and McIver scores in the third column.184 The scores
ranged from -1.54 to 2.12. Once again, higher scores represented a higher level of state
policy liberalism. The negative scores indicated states with more conservative policies.
The number in parentheses next to each score reported the state’s rank on that particular
policy liberalism scale. Neither set of researchers had data to for Alaska or Hawaii. The
table does not include a score for either state.
The Policy Liberalism Score (2008) indicated the Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger
policy liberalism scores for 2008 in the fourth column. The scores ranged from -6.558986
to 14.65067. The Policy Liberalism Score (2010) indicated the policy liberalism scores
for 2010 in the fifth column. The scores ranged from -5.700675 to 14.65067. For both
scores, higher scores represented higher levels of policy liberalism.
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Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger did have policy liberalism scores for Alaska and
Hawaii. I excluded the scores for two reasons, though. First, Klingman and Lammers as
well as Erikson, Wright, and McIver did not have scores for Alaska and Hawaii.
Therefore, to make the analysis of policy liberalism more comparable across time, I did
not include the Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger scores for those states. Second, Alaska and
Hawaii are much newer states than the 48 contiguous states. The development of
journalist’s privilege in the United States began well before either state was a part of the
union. The policy liberalism of the other 48 states likely influenced the early
development of journalist’s privilege before Hawaii and Alaska had applied for
statehood.
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Table 3-1: State Policy Liberalism Scores
Liberalism Score
Liberalism Score
Liberalism Score
Liberalism Score
State
(1984)
(1993)
(2008)
(2010)
Alabama
-1.285 (44)
-1.45 (45)
-3.86446 (42)
-4.330914 (43)
Arizona
-1.403 (45)
-1.05 (43)
-2.650717 (30)
-3.101448 (38)
Arkansas
-1.863 (47)
-1.54 (48)
-3.561909 (41)
-3.181858 (39)
California
1.464 (4)
1.49 (3)
14.65067 (1)
14.80074 (1)
Colorado
1.121 (9)
0.48 (17)
-0.5932837 (21)
-0.3259152 (23)
Connecticut
1.453 (5)
1.19 (7)
6.87584 (7)
7.541123 (8)
Delaware
0.09 (24)
1.11 (9)
2.719852 (10)
3.481929 (10)
Florida
-0.481 (31)
-0.37 (28)
-0.4811046 (20)
-0.2184499 (21)
Georgia
-0.933 (41)
-1.04 (42)
-3.43501 (39)
-2.934662 (35)
Idaho
0.138 (21)
-0.87 (36)
-5.713753 (45)
-5.594581 (46)
Illinois
0.539 (14)
0.41 (20)
6.8053970 (8)
7.957626 (7)
Indiana
-0.615 (35)
-1.2 (44)
-2.281557 (29)
-2.504499 (29)
Iowa
0.303 (18)
0.44 (18)
-0.4326032 (19)
-0.0544632 (19)
Kansas
0.207 (19)
0.24 (22)
-3.2685320 (36)
-2.92412 (34)
Kentucky
-0.304 (29)
-0.32 (26)
-2.211666 (28)
-2.586181 (31)
Louisiana
-0.668 (36)
-1.04 (41)
-1.773365 (26)
-1.615295 (27)
Maine
0.119 (22)
-0.02 (24)
1.663444 (12)
2.163893 (12)
Maryland
0.393 (15)
0.85 (11)
8.49905 (6)
9.179784 (5)
Massachusetts
1.805 (2)
1.64 (2)
12.6944 (3)
12.58624 (4)
Michigan
1.1 (10)
1.18 (8)
3.35728 (9)
3.886693 (9)
Minnesota
1.227 (8)
0.79 (12)
1.457715 (13)
1.523621 (14)
Mississippi
-2.061 (48)
-1.51 (46)
-4.714653 (43)
-4.158239 (42)
Missouri
-0.895 (39)
-0.55 (31)
-3.490848 (40)
-2.952449 (36)
Montana
0.107 (23)
0.6 (16)
-3.201081 (33)
-2.712624 (32)
Nebraska
-0.251 (28)
0.44 (19)
-3.271613 (37)
-2.76664 (33)
Nevada
-1.17 (42)
-0.35 (27)
-1.7216 (25)
-1.329185 (26)
New Hampshire
0.386 (16)
-0.14 (25)
-0.6467845 (22)
-0.2324234 (22)
New Jersey
1.518 (3)
1.34 (5)
13.11908 (2)
13.12912 (3)
New Mexico
-0.146 (27)
-0.99 (40)
-2.027544 (27)
-1.210673 (25)
New York
1.862 (1)
2.12 (1)
12.60431 (4)
13.15749 (2)
North Carolina
-0.923 (40)
-0.96 (38)
0.2267685 (17)
0.6476505 (17)
North Dakota
-0.11 (26)
-0.52 (30)
-6.558986 (48)
-5.700675 (48)
Ohio
0.145 (20)
0.64 (15)
1.012002 (15)
0.5903817 (18)
Oklahoma
-0.86 (38)
-0.98 (39)
-3.325849 (38)
-3.240067 (40)
Oregon
1.436 (6)
1.39 (4)
0.2098694 (18)
1.387446 (15)
Pennsylvania
1.06 (11)
1.01 (10)
0.6582834 (16)
1.165166 (16)
Rhode Island
0.871 (12)
0.68 (14)
8.74255 (5)
8.671363 (6)
South Carolina
-1.491 (46)
-1.53 (47)
-3.151124 (32)
-2.476265 (28)
South Dakota
-0.582 (32)
-0.95 (37)
-5.468121 (44)
-4.756213 (44)
Tennessee
-1.209 (43)
-0.85 (35)
-3.213797 (34)
-2.582896 (30)
Texas
-0.389 (30)
-0.65 (32)
-3.257484 (35)
-3.431674 (41)
Utah
-0.584 (33)
-0.44 (29)
-5.848618 (46)
-5.03959 (45)
Vermont
0.352 (17)
0.79 (13)
1.394279 (14)
1.936672 (13)
Virginia
-0.738 (37)
-0.84 (34)
-3.144677 (31)
-3.048693 (37)
Washington
0.576 (13)
0.35 (21)
2.63167 (11)
3.041979 (11)
West Virginia
-0.608 (34)
0.12 (23)
-1.5328 (24)
-1.197113 (24)
Wisconsin
1.378 (7)
1.23 (6)
-0.9285712 (23)
-0.1621033 (20)
Wyoming
-0.081 (25)
-0.7 (33)
-6.367966 (47)
-5.5982920 (47)
Note: The number in parentheses indicated the state’s overall rank on a scale of 1 to 48.
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Sharkansky’s state political culture classifications determined a state’s political
culture.185 Sharkansky’s designations were based on Elazar’s work with minor
adjustments. Sharkansky identified a variety of indicators that allowed for an empirical
measure of state political culture.186 The process was different than Elazar’s, who created
his designations based primarily on personal observations. Overall, though, Sharkansky’s
and Elazar’s designations were closely matched.187
Table 3-2 reports the results of Sharkansky’s classifications. Sharkansky’s scores
identified 18 moralistic states, 18 traditionalistic states, and 14 individualistic states
Table 3-2: State Political Cultures

Moralistic
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Idaho
Iowa
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
New Hampshire
North Dakota
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Utah
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin

185

Individualistic
Alaska
Arizona
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Massachusetts
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Wyoming

Traditionalistic
Alabama
Arkansas
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
New Mexico
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia

Ira Sharkansky, The Utility of Elazar’s Political Culture: A Research Note, POLITY, Autumn 1969, at
72.
186
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187
Id., at 83.
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Validity Check
To ensure that I coded the statutes and court opinions accurately, an additional
person coded one state for a validity check. The additional coder and I agreed on most
provisions. Of the few disagreements, the other coder and I discussed the particular
provision of journalist’s privilege. After discussion, we agreed on the correct coding of
the law in all cases.
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Chapter 4: Results
Coding Results
I collected and analyzed the statutes of 37 states and more than 250 state appellate
court decisions for this research.188 In several states, the shield statute was split between
multiple sections of the state code. In two states, the state legislature had not enacted a
state shield statute. Rather, the state supreme courts promulgated shield protections into
the state rules of evidence.189 Five states had a shield statute but did not have any state
appellate court decisions within the past 50 years that addressed journalist’s privilege.190
Three states did not have a shield statute or have any state appellate court decisions
within the past 50 years that addressed journalist’s privilege.191
Several states based a journalist’s privilege in multiple sources of law. 192 The
results of the coding indicated that appellate courts in 19 states recognized a basis for
journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment. Courts in eight of those 19 states
interpreted that their state constitution also provided a journalist’s privilege. Every state
that had a basis for the privilege in the state constitution also found the privilege in the
First Amendment. No state held that the state constitution alone provided a journalist’s
privilege. California was the only state that had language that explicitly created a
journalist’s privilege in the state constitution.
Thirty-seven states had legislatively enacted shield statutes. In 23 of those states,
the statute was the only source of the state’s journalist privilege. One state, New Mexico,
188
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had legislatively enacted a shield statute that the state supreme court later declared
unconstitutional.193 Although New Mexico’s statute is still on the books, I did not code
New Mexico as having a legislatively-enacted shield statute.
Six states found a basis for journalist’s privilege in the common law. The
common law was the only basis for journalist’s privilege in South Dakota and
Massachusetts. In Utah and New Mexico, the state supreme court promulgated the
privilege into the state rules of evidence. Therefore, I coded that the shield protection in
Utah and Mexico were found in the common law. The other two states, Idaho and
Washington, based the journalist’s privilege in other sources of law in addition to the
common law basis.
Hawaii, Mississippi and Wyoming did not have any source for journalist’s
privilege. The appellate courts within those states had not recognized journalist’s
privilege in the First Amendment, state constitution, or the common law. The three states
also did not have a legislatively enacted shield. Hawaii previously had a shield statute,
but it expired in 2013.194
The scope of protection represented the different types of information that
journalists could protect.195 The coding for this category represented only whether
information could potentially receive protection. Every state that recognized a
journalist’s privilege provided protection for confidential sources. Thirty-four states
allowed journalists to refuse to reveal information about sources whether or not the
journalists promised confidentiality.
193
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Thirty states extended some form of protection to journalists’ unpublished
information. Unpublished information that was protected typically included notes,
outtakes, photographs, and film recordings. Statutes and state appellate court decisions
provided protection for unpublished information. None of the states made distinctions
among different types of information. The only distinction that courts made was for
personal observations. Observations were accounted for in a different category.
Six states expressly provided protection to journalists’ personal observations.
Many states did not address whether a journalist’s personal observations were protected.
The six states that protected observations specifically discussed that type of information
either in the shield statute or court decisions. Of the six states, California was the only
one that indicated it protected all of a journalist’s observations. The other five states
made exceptions for the different kinds of observations a journalist could protect.
Typically, journalists could not refuse to testify about eyewitness observations of certain
crimes or acts of violence.
Journalists could invoke the different types of a testimonial privilege in different
settings.196 Thirty-two states had a qualified privilege in the situations when the privilege
applied. The other 15 states provided journalists with an absolute privilege in at least one
setting. In five states, journalist’s privilege could be used in only one context. Each of
these states had only recognized a privilege through court opinions.
Journalist’s privilege in 36 states granted journalists some form of protection from
investigative subpoenas. Thirty-one states provided journalists a privilege in legislative
hearings. Forty-three states provided protection to journalists in non-libel civil litigation.
In each of the different situations, twelve states granted an absolute privilege. Journalists
196
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could refuse to provide information to criminal defendants in 44 states. Only five states
provided an absolute privilege in this context. Finally, 39 states granted journalists a
privilege when they are libel defendants. Nine states allowed an absolute privilege.
Four states appeared to provide an absolute journalist’s privilege in any type of
setting. In two of the states, Alabama and Nebraska, appellate courts had not interpreted
the statute. Another four states provided an absolute privilege in all settings except when
criminal defendants needed information to maintain a defense. In those situations, each of
the states held that the privilege was qualified. In several of these states, the shield statute
had granted an absolute privilege but state appellate courts indicated that a criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights trumped the shield.
States varied on who could invoke the journalist’s privilege.197 A total of 44 states
expressly allowed newspaper employees to claim journalist’s privilege. Three states that
did not protect newspaper journalists had established journalist’s privilege through court
opinions. None of the cases had involved newspapers. Although newspaper reporters
would likely be covered, the state had not specifically addressed the issue. Therefore, I
did not code newspaper reporters as having the privilege. The other three states where
newspaper journalists were not protected did not recognize a journalist’s privilege.
Forty-four states provided journalist’s privilege to television reporters. Employees
of radio media could invoke journalist’s privilege in 39 states. Journalists in television
and radio media are typically considered traditional journalists. The likelihood of a state
extending the privilege to these types of journalists is very high. States without shield
statutes have simply not addressed cases that involve radio and television journalists in
state appellate courts. Once again, I did not code these journalists as having the privilege.
197
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Journalists for print media other than newspapers could invoke the privilege in 36
states. Freelance journalists could also claim the privilege in 37 states. Freelance
journalists were often covered in state statutes that granted protection to any person
connected with news media. Only 10 states allowed book authors to use the privilege.
Journalists who work for news media that publish exclusively online were
explicitly covered in nine states. Bloggers who publish independently were not covered
in any state. The language of some state shield statutes stated that journalists who
published information electronically were entitled to protection. Internet journalists and
bloggers certainly publish information electronically. The state was coded as providing
the privilege to Internet journalists only if a state’s statute or appellate courts specifically
addressed Internet journalists, though.
As a whole, many states did not extend protections to non-traditional journalists.
The Maryland and West Virginia shield statutes granted student journalists protection.
Academic researchers in Delaware and Texas could invoke the privilege. Alaska, Illinois,
and Louisiana have extended the privilege to documentary filmmakers. California
allowed issue activists to use journalist’s privilege when they function as journalists.
Finally, New Jersey has considered the publisher of an annual report rating insurers as a
journalist for the purposes of the privilege.
On average, states that recognized journalist’s privilege protected 4.85 different
categories of people. New Jersey and Texas had the broadest definitions of journalists.
Both states provided the privilege to eight types of people. California, Maryland and
Washington also granted the privilege to seven different categories. Missouri, South
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Dakota, Vermont and Virginia’s definition were the narrowest with each state providing
the privilege to one category. None of these states had a shield statute, though.
Table 4-1 reports the total score for each state on the state shield breadth index.
California’s score of 36 was the highest among the states. Three states, Hawaii,
Mississippi and Wyoming, had scores of zero. None of the three states had recognized
journalist’s privilege in state appellate court decisions or state statutes. The mean score
was 21.36. The mode for the data set was 23 with seven states having that score.
If the three states without a statute or appellate court decision recognizing
journalist’s privilege are removed, the mean score was 22.72. The lowest score was
seven. Missouri, South Dakota, and Virginia all scored seven on the shield breadth index.
Table 4-1: Index score of individual state shield breadth

State
California
New Jersey
Texas
Nebraska
Wisconsin
Louisiana
New York
Washington
Delaware
Florida
West Virginia
Maryland
Oregon
Kansas
Montana
Oklahoma
Illinois
Minnesota
Nevada
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Alabama
Arizona
Connecticut
Kentucky

Total
36
34
31
30
30
29
29
29
28
28
28
27
27
26
26
26
25
25
25
25
25
24
24
24
24

State
North Carolina
Alaska
Arkansas
Colorado
Indiana
Michigan
North Dakota
South Carolina
Georgia
Tennessee
Utah
New Mexico
Maine
Rhode Island
Idaho
Iowa
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Vermont
Missouri
South Dakota
Virginia
Hawaii
Mississippi
Wyoming

Total
24
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
22
22
19
18
17
17
16
13
13
12
9
7
7
7
0
0
0
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Political Culture and Journalist’s Privilege Protections
Table 4-2 reports the means comparison test of the state shield strength index
score according to state political culture.
Table 4-2: Means comparison test of shield strength according to political culture.

Political Culture
Individualistic
Moralistic
Traditionalistic
Shield Strength Index Score

Mean
21.50
20.94
21.67
21.36

Number of cases
14
18
18
50

Standard Deviation
10.301
7.658
8.534
8.595

The first hypothesis suggested that states with moralistic political culture would
provide broader protections for journalists than states with traditionalistic or
individualistic cultures. Individualistic states had an average score of 21.50.
Traditionalistic states had an average score of 21.67. Moralistic states had an average
score of 20.94. The scores were not significantly different from each other. Therefore, the
data did not support the first hypothesis.
Policy Liberalism and Journalist’s Privilege Protections
The second hypothesis suggested that states with higher scores of policy
liberalism would provide broader protections for states than those with lower scores. To
test the hypothesis, I used Pearson correlations to examine the relationships between the
Klingman and Lammers (1984) policy liberalism scores, the Erikson, Wright, and McIver
(1993) policy liberalism scores, Sorens, Muedini, and Rugers 2008 and 2010 policy
liberalism scores, and the index of shield strength. The results of the test are reported in
Table 4-3.
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Table 4-3: Correlations of policy liberalism and shield strength.

Klingman &
Lammers Score
(1984)

Erikson, Wright,
& McIver Score
(1993)

Sorens, Muedini,
& Ruger Score
(2008)

Sorens, Muedini,
& Ruger Score
(2010)

Index of Shield
Strength

.272*

.346**

.345**

.337**

R2

.074

.120

.119

.113

N = 48

* p < .05

** p < .01

First, the correlation between the Klingman and Lammers (1984) score and
Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) score was .906 (p < .01). The correlation between
the Klingman & Lammers (1984) score and the Sorens, Muedini, & Ruger 2008 and 2010
scores were .710 (p < .01) and .720 (p < .01), respectively. The correlation between the
Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993) score and the Sorens, Muedini, & Ruger 2008 and
2010 scores were .755 (p < .01) and .768 (p <.01), respectively. The high level of
correlation among the scores is unsurprising. All scores aimed to measure state policy
liberalism. The Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993) score also incorporated two of the
same policy issue indicators as the Klingman and Lammers (1984) score.
The correlation between the index score of shield strength and the Klingman and
Lammers (1984) score was .272 (p < .05). The correlation between the shield strength
index score and the Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993) score was .346 (p < .01). The
correlation between the shield strength index score and the Sorens, Muedini, & Ruger
(2008) score was .345 (p < .01). The correlation between the shield strength index score
and the Sorens, Muedini, & Ruger (2010) score was .337 (p < .01). Thus, the
hypothesized relationship between policy liberalism and the strength of journalist’s
protections within a state was supported. The Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993) score

56

was the most strongly correlated with the state shield strength. Both versions of the
Sorens, Muedini, & Ruger scores were also strongly correlated.
Figure 4-1 is a scatterplot of the correlation between the Klingman and Lammers
policy liberalism score and a state’s shield strength score.
Figure 4-1: Distribution of shield strength according to Klingman & Lammers (1984) scores

The graph showed the trend of the shield strength index score increasing as the
Klingman and Lammers policy liberalism score increases. States that fell below the
correlation line tended to be states that had not enacted a state shield statute. The biggest
outliers of all the states were Mississippi and Wyoming. Neither state had recognized a
journalist’s privilege in state appellate court decisions or through legislation.
Massachusetts had a high policy liberalism score but a lower score on the shield strength
index. The state had only recognized a journalist’s privilege in the common law.
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California was an outlier because it provided expansive protections. The state had
recognized several sources for journalist’s privilege and several different people could
invoke the privilege. Several of California’s protections were also absolute.
Figure 4-2 is a scatterplot of the correlation between the Erikson, Wright, and
McIver policy liberalism score and a state’s shield strength score.
Figure 4-2: Distribution of shield strength according to Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993) scores

Once again, the graph showed a trend of the state shield strength score increasing
as the policy liberalism score increases. The correlation was stronger with the Erikson,
Wright, and McIver (1993) policy score as compared to the Klingman and Lammers
(1984) score. Many of the states that fell below the line were states without shield
statutes. The outliers were also similar to the outliers on the Klingman and Lammers
(1984) graph.
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Figure 4-3 is a scatterplot of the correlation between the Sorens, Muedini, &
Roger policy liberalism score from 2008 and a state’s shield strength score.
Figure 4-3: Distribution of shield strength according to Sorens, Muedini &Ruger (2008) scores

The graph showed the trend of state shield strength increasing as the policy
liberalism increases. Several of the states that fell under the line were states that did not
have a shield statute. Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Wyoming remained obvious
outliers. California was not nearly as much of an outlier as it had been on the previous
graphs.
Figure 4-4 is a scatterplot of the correlation between the Sorens, Muedini, &
Roger policy liberalism score from 2010 and a state’s shield strength score.
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Figure 4-4: Distribution of shield strength according to Sorens, Muedini &Ruger (2010) scores

The graph once again showed the trend of state shield strength increasing as
policy liberalism increases. Many of the states that fell below the line had not enacted
shield statutes. Several of the outliers were similar to the outliers on the previous graphs.
As an additional check of other factors that may influence a state’s shield
strength, I conducted correlation tests of the index of shield strength score and other state
characteristics. Different state characteristics included the percentage of the two-party
vote for Barack Obama in 2008198 and 2012,199 the percentage of high school graduates in

198

Federal Election Commission, Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S.
Senate and the House of Representatives, available at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalelections2008.pdf.
199
Federal Election Commission, Official 2012 Presidential General Election Results, available at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/2012presgeresults.pdf.
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the state,200 the percentage of people who had bachelor’s degrees in the state,201 and per
capita personal income within the state.202 None of the additional state characteristics
were significantly correlated with state shield strength.

200

United States Census Bureau, American Community Survey: Educational Attainment, 2011 5-year
estimates, available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/.
201
Id.
202
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012 Per Capita Personal Income Summary, available at
http://www.bea.gov.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Discussion
The results of this study add to the evidence that state characteristics are
important determinants of state media law. Specifically, the results suggested that policy
liberalism is a better indicator of state shield protections than political culture. The
relationships between several different measures of policy liberalism and the strength of
protection journalists have were significant. The different policy liberalism scores created
from several different years of data were similarly correlated with state shield strength.
State political culture did not seem to influence the breadth of states’ journalistic
protections. The result was not entirely surprising because a previous study failed to find
a significant relationship between political culture and the openness of public records
law.203 Elazar highlighted that the major components of political culture include citizens’
perceptions of politics and government, the types of people involved in government, and
the art of individuals practicing government.204 Each aspect highlighted the way
individuals interact with government. None focus on the actual actions of government to
create law. Certainly, political culture could influence the development of law, but it
might be limited to affecting certain types of law. Media law does not appear to be one of
the types of law that political culture influences.
The relationship between policy liberalism and a state’s breadth of journalist’s
privilege is important for several reasons. The results indicated that states with higher
levels of policy liberalism tended to grant broader protections for journalists. Liberal
states are more likely to grant journalists protections for different types of information
203
204

Pritchard & Nemeth, supra note 12, at 54.
ELAZAR, supra note 22, at 112.
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and in different situations. Liberal states also tend to have more diverse definitions of
journalist. The finding is particularly significant because issues surrounding journalist’s
privilege are not fully settled. Courts are still determining whether the United States
Constitution or their state constitutions provide journalists a privilege. Courts are also
still discussing who can be considered a journalist under their state laws. Also, several
states have not enacted a shield statute that would create a journalist’s privilege. If those
states do enact shield statutes, this study’s results suggest that the states with higher
levels of policy liberalism will likely create broader protections for journalists. The
results also suggest that even if states with low levels of policy liberalism enact a shield
statute, protection would likely be greater than having no statute at all. Thus, journalists
are justified in working toward the passage of shield legislation if they want broader
protections.
The results also suggest a larger trend in the development of media law in
individual states. A previous study has suggested that policy liberalism was an important
determinant of media law.205 This study’s results demonstrated that policy liberalism was
a predictor of the strength of a state’s journalist’s privilege. The combination of the two
studies begins to suggest that policy liberalism influences laws that affect journalists.
Granted, broad conclusions about the nature of a particular type of law cannot be made
from two studies alone. The results of the two studies are merely a starting place for a
potential trend.
The law of journalist’s privilege exemplifies Justice Brandeis’ idea that states are
“the laboratories of democracy.”206 Without any federal mandates of how a privilege
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must be interpreted, states have been free to experiment within the confines of their own
borders. States have shaped journalist’s privilege through statutes and court opinions in
ways that are best suited for the state. As a result, states like California and New Jersey
have granted journalists a strong privilege to protect information. Other states like
Hawaii, Mississippi, and Wyoming have not found the need to clearly establish a
testimonial privilege for journalists through statutes or appellate court decisions. The
wide-range of diversity in the law of journalist’s privilege is a clear example of the
American system of federalism.
Another finding of this study is that states regularly define who is a journalist.
The coding for who can invoke the privilege shows that most states have clearly
established definitions of a journalist for purposes of the privilege. Several statutes
explicitly spell out who is eligible for protection. State appellate courts have also limited
definitions of journalists to certain types of people. The statutes and decisions usually
place limits on who can invoke the privilege based on a person’s employment.
Employees of traditional media are far more likely to be eligible for journalist’s privilege
protections. As a result of defining journalists by their employment, few states have
extended journalist’s privilege to non-traditional journalists. Some states are willing to
view book authors as journalists. Fewer states explicitly include documentary
filmmakers, student journalists, academics, or issue activists in the definition of
journalists. Overall, states are clearly willing to define who is a journalist. This situation
is quite the opposite of the philosophy of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court has been
unwilling to create definitions of a journalist.207
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See Branzburg, supra note 3, at 703-704; Citizens United, supra note 6, at 891 (2010).
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This study also found that states have not significantly considered journalist’s
privilege for new forms of media. State appellate courts or shield statutes in nine states
have explicitly granted journalist’s privilege to people who work for Internet media. State
appellate courts have not granted a privilege to any individual bloggers or lone internet
publishers. New Jersey was the only state with an appellate court that considered whether
a lone individual publishing online could qualify for the privilege.208 The lack of
appellate court decisions doesn’t necessarily mean that bloggers are not facing subpoena
challenges, though. Individual bloggers likely have limited monetary resources. They do
not have the ability to pursue expensive, drawn-out legal actions. As a result, trial courts
are likely the only courts resolving any issues involving bloggers and journalist’s
privilege.
Ultimately, one of the most significant questions about journalist’s privilege is
whether it is good or bad. The answer is both. The fact that so many states have
recognized a journalist’s privilege suggests that states believe the protection of sources is
important to journalism. Many states are willing to provide a wide variety of shield
protections to journalists, which suggest that many states recognize the importance of a
privilege. Critics of a privilege argue that journalists’ suggestions of sources drying up
are unfounded. Reporters will still use confidential sources despite the lack of protection.
While this situation might be true, the general idea of jailing journalists for non-criminal
reasons seems like a troubling proposition in any society that wants to foster free flowing
information.
The downside of journalist’s privilege is the current state of definitions of
journalists. Many states define journalists by their employers. The landscape of
208

Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 20 A.3d 364 (N.J. 2011).
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journalism is steadily evolving to include people who will never work for a traditional
media outlet. Journalists are leaving traditional media outlets to start their own blogs and
websites to report news. Citizen journalists are finding ways to practice journalism
without journalistic training. People like Wikileaks founder Julian Assange have the
ability to produce news through non-traditional journalistic means. Granted, many
people, like Assange, might not actually be journalists. Definitions of journalists need to
begin to focus more on the practice of journalism than the employment status of a
journalist. The privilege will quickly become outdated if the current definitions of
journalists do not change.
States will need to grapple with the problems of new media as Internet publishing
continues to expand. States will need to update their laws to determine whether Internet
journalists deserve the protections that traditional news media retain. Questions will also
arise as to whether users of social media could invoke the privilege. These problems are
not limited to issues of journalist’s privilege alone. As others have pointed out, the
current state of media-related law has a variety of new challenges in the Internet age.209
The law will remain relevant only if states begin adapting the laws they developed before
the advent of the online world.
Limitations
Every study has its limitations, and this study is no exception. Laws are not static.
They are constantly being amended or repealed. They are always being interpreted and
re-interpreted. Therefore, the coded laws can represent only the information that was
209
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available at the time of the study. The values given to the various provisions could
certainly change in future replications of this study as journalist’s privilege continues to
evolve. Content analysis is the process of simplifying complex information into
manageable numbers. In the conversion process, detail is undoubtedly lost. Laws are
complex and dependent on detail. A single number cannot always fully represent every
dimension of a particular law. Even though I coded many provisions of journalist’s
privilege, some information about each state’s law could have been lost.
Additionally, the research at hand was limited to the analysis of state appellate
court decisions. State trial court decisions can also provide insight into how a state views
media law. Granted, decisions of such courts are not always binding on the way state
appellate courts interpret the law. Nonetheless, the decisions of those courts could
provide useful insight into the law.
Further Research
Future studies should continue to look at the relationships between policy
liberalism and state media law. Further research into these relationships could develop
stronger evidence that policy liberalism has an effect on media law. Research also needs
to be conducted into individual states’ definitions of journalists. Many states did not have
clear or precise definitions of who is eligible to invoke journalist’s privilege.
Examinations of the legislative history of statutes, trial court opinions, and appellate court
decisions related to other types of media law could provide better insight into who might
be considered a journalist within a state. Research of this nature will become increasingly
important. In a world where publishing simply requires an Internet connection, media
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laws that were created before the existence of computers will have trouble remaining
relevant.
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Appendix A: Coding Scheme
Coding Sheet
STATE

_______________________________________________________________

POLCULT

1=Individualistic, 2=Moralistic, 3=Traditionalistic.................................. ______

POL-LIB

Policy liberalism scores................................................. KL______ EWM ______

SOURCE1

Source of protection for journalists is found in the U.S. Constitution:
0=no, 2=yes………………………………………………………….…

______

Source of protection for journalists is found in the state constitution:
0=no, 2=yes…………………………………………………………….

______

Source of protection for journalists is found in a state statute:
0=no, 2=yes…………………………………………………………….

______

SOURCE2

SOURCE3

SOURCE4

Source of protection for journalists is found in state common law:
0=no, 2=yes……………………………………………………….……. ______

SCOPE1

Does the law give the right to withhold the identity of a confidential source?
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes………………………………….…………. ______

SCOPE2

Does the law give the right to withhold unpublished info even if it does
not reveal the identity of a confidential source?
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes ……………………………………..……… ______

SCOPE3

Does the law give the right to protect non-confidential sources?
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes ……………………………………………..

______

Does the law give the right to withhold personal observations?
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes ………………………………………….…

______

SCOPE4

CONTEXT1

Does the law give the right to withhold information from investigators or
investigative bodies that have issued a subpoena?
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes………………………………………………. ______

CONTEXT2

Does the law give the right to withhold information from legislative bodies?
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes …………………………………...................... ______

CONTEXT3

Does the law give the right to withhold information from criminal
defendants seeking it for their defense? 0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes …… ______

CONTEXT4

Does the law give the right to withhold information
from parties to non-libel civil litigation? 0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes…… ______

CONTEXT5

Does the law give libel defendants a right to withhold info from plaintiffs
needing to know the name of a source to pursue a claim?
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes ……………………………………………… ______
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COVERS1

The law protects employees who work for newspapers that publish daily or
weekly: 0=no, 2=yes………………………….………………………… ______

COVERS2

The law protects employees who work for other forms of print media:
0=no, 2=yes…………………..................................................................... ______

COVERS3

The law protects employees who work for television media:
0=no, 2=yes……………………………………………………………... ______

COVERS4

The law protects employees who work for radio media:
0=no, 2=yes……………………………………………………………… ______

COVERS5

The law protects employees of internet only media:
0=no, 2=yes………………….…………………………………..……… ______

COVERS6

The law protects freelancers who sell their material to established media:
0=no, 2=yes………………….................................................................... ______

COVERS7

The law protects bloggers who do not work for established media:
0=no, 2=yes…………………..................................................................... ______

COVERS8

The law protects students working for student media:
0=no, 2=yes…………………………………………………….............. ______

COVERS9

The law protects book authors: 0=no, 2=yes…………………................ ______

COVERS10

The law protects academic researchers: 0=no, 2=yes……………........... ______

COVERS11

The law protects issue activists: 0=no, 2=yes…………............................ ______

COVERS12

The law protects documentary filmmakers: 0=no, 2=yes…………….… ______

COVERS13

The law protects other groups of people not previously mentioned:
0=no, 2=yes………………….................................................................... ______
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Coding Instructions
In the packet of information, you will be reading state laws and court opinions. As you
read, please pay close attention to and note the following topics. Please feel free to code
areas as you read. Some packets of information will contain several pages and coding
only upon completion will not be sufficient.
Some court opinions can contradict each other. If this situation exists, please code for the
most recent interpretation. For example, if a court opinion determines that book authors
receive journalist’s privilege in 2000, but another court opinion says that book authors do
not receive journalist’s privilege in 2010, please code that book authors do not receive
protection.
If a situation arises whether it is unclear if a particular provision exists, please code that
the provision as a 0. For example, if no court opinions or law have addressed whether
unpublished information can be withheld from authorities, code that withholding
unpublished material is not protected.
1. STATE
Each packet has a name of a state written on the upper right. Write the name of the state
on the line.
2. POLCULT
Each packet has a political culture on the upper right corner. Write a 1 for an
individualistic state. Write a 2 for a moralistic state. Write a 3 for a traditionalistic state.
3. POL-LIB
Each packet has two policy liberalism scores written on the upper right corner. One is
labeled KL. The other is labeled EWM. Write the number on the appropriate line.
4. SOURCE1
If a court opinion indicates that a journalist’s privilege can be found in the United States
Constitution, mark a 2. If the opinions do not find a basis for journalist’s privilege in the
United States Constitution, mark a 0.
5. SOURCE2
If a court opinion indicates that a journalist’s privilege can be found in the state’s
constitution, mark a 2. Also, if a constitutional amendment establishes a journalist’s
privilege, mark a 2. If the opinions do not find a basis for journalist’s privilege in the
state constitution or a constitutional amendment does not exist, mark a 0.
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6. SOURCE3
If a state statute, law, provision or code establishes a journalist’s privilege, mark a 2. If
the state does not have a statute, law, provision or code present, mark 0.
7. SOURCE4
If a journalist’s privilege has been established through the common law, mark a 2. If
there are no opinions finding a journalist’s privilege in other laws, mark a 0.
8. SCOPE1
If the state’s journalist’s privilege allows individuals to withhold the identities of
confidential sources, mark a 2. Confidential sources are sources whose identity a
journalist keeps secret in a news story. If some types of confidential sources are protected
but others are not, mark a 1. If the privilege does not state that confidential sources are
protected, mark a 0.
9. SCOPE2
If the state’s journalist’s privilege allows individuals to withhold unpublished information
even if it does not reveal the identity of a confidential source, mark a 2. Unpublished
information can include, but is not limited to, notes, photographs, recordings, video
footage, outtakes and observations. If some types of unpublished information is protected
but other types are not, mark a 1. If the privilege does not explicitly state unpublished
information is protected, mark a 0.
10. SCOPE3
If the state’s journalist’s privilege allows individuals to protect non-confidential sources
of information, mark a 2. If some types of non-confidential sources are protected but
others are not, mark a 1. If the privilege only exists in situations where an individual
explicitly makes a promise of confidentiality to a source, mark a 0.
11. SCOPE 4
If the state’s journalist’s privilege allows individuals to withhold information gathered
from personal observations, mark a 2. If some types of personal observations are
protected but others are not, mark a 1. If the privilege does not provide protection for an
individual’s personal observations, mark a 0.
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12. CONTEXT1
If the state’s journalist’s privilege grants an absolute privilege to withhold information
from people or bodies that have issued an investigative subpoena, mark a 2. Grand juries,
prosecutors, and other types of investigators can issue investigative subpoenas. If the law
provides a qualified privilege, mark a 1. If the law does not allow individuals to withhold
information from bodies that issued an investigative subpoena, mark a 0. .

13. CONTEXT2
If the state’s journalist’s privilege grants an absolute privilege to withhold information
from legislative bodies, mark a 2. A legislative body can include, but is not limited to,
legislative sub-committee, committee, house of representatives, senate, assembly, or
legislature. If the law provides a qualified privilege, mark a 1. If the law does not allow
individuals to withhold information from legislative bodies, mark a 0.
14. CONTEXT3
If the state’s journalist’s privilege grants an absolute privilege to withhold information
from criminal defendants seeking it for their defense, mark a 2. Most often, criminal
defendants will be seeking the information from individuals during trial court
proceedings. If the law provides a qualified privilege, mark a 1. If the law does not allow
individuals to withhold information from criminal defendants, mark a 0.
15. CONTEXT4
If the state’s journalist’s privilege grants an absolute privilege to withhold information
from parties to non-libel civil litigation, mark a 2. Non-libel civil litigation includes any
type of non-criminal litigation other than defamation suits. Parties to this type of
litigation can include individuals, groups, organizations, businesses and governments. If
the law provides a qualified privilege, mark a 1. If the law does not allow individuals to
withhold information from parties in non-criminal litigation, mark a 0.
16. CONTEXT5
If the state’s journalist’s privilege grants an absolute privilege to media defendants in
libel suits a right to withhold information from plaintiffs needing the name of a source to
pursue a claim, mark a 2. Libel suits are litigation concerning defamation in a print,
broadcast or published medium. Typically, the media defendant is not the source of
libelous information. Rather, the media defendant published alleged libelous statements
from a source. As a result, the plaintiff is attempting to get information about the source
from the defendant. If the law provides a qualified privilege, mark a 1. If the libel
defendants are not able to withhold information from plaintiffs, mark a 0.
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17. COVERS1
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects employees who work for newspapers, mark a
2. An employee is a person who a newspaper business employs on a full-time or parttime basis. This type of employment is different from newspapers hiring a freelance
worker. If the law does not protect newspaper employees, mark a 0.
18. COVERS2
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects employees who work for other forms of print
media, mark a 2. Other forms of print media can include, but are not limited to,
magazines, wire services, newsletters, brochures, flyers and posters. An employee is a
person who the print media business officially employs on a full-time or part-time basis.
This type of employment is different from businesses hiring a freelance worker. If the
law does not protect employees of other print media, mark a 0.
19. COVERS3
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects employees who work for television media,
mark a 2. An employee is a person who a television station officially employs on a full or
part-time basis. This type of employment is different from a station hiring a freelance
worker. If the law does not protect television employees, mark a 0.
20. COVERS4
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects employees who work for radio media, mark a
2. An employee is a person who a radio station officially employs on a full or part-time
basis. This type of employment is different from a station hiring a freelance worker. If the
law does not protect radio employees, mark a 0.
21. COVERS5
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects employees of Internet only media, mark a 2.
Internet only media can include, but are not limited to, web sites, blogs, social media
sites, electronic newsletters, podcasts and online videos. An employee is a person the
online medium employs on a full or part-time basis. This type of employment is different
from an online medium hiring a freelance worker. If the law does not protect employees
of internet only media, mark a 0.
22. COVERS6
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects freelancers who sell their work to established
media, mark a 2. A freelancer is a person who is self-employed who creates media
content. The freelancer then sells that content to media organizations. A freelancer is not
committed to working for only one media organization on a long-term basis. If the law
does not protect freelancers, mark a 0.

82

23. COVERS7
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects bloggers who do not work for established
media, mark a 2. This type of blogger is a person that runs a blog independently of any
media organization. The content of the blog can include factual reports. It can include a
person’s own commentary and opinions. The content could not be construed to be
reflective of any media organization. If the law does not protect bloggers, mark a 0.
24. COVERS8
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects students working for student-run media, mark
a 2. Students include, but are not limited to, people attending middle school, high school,
colleges or universities. Student-run media are any publications for which students have
primary control over the content. If the law does not protect students, mark a 0.
25. COVERS9
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects book authors, mark a 2. A book author is any
person that is collecting information with the intent to publish in book form. If the law
does not protect book authors, mark a 0.
26. COVERS10
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects academic researchers, mark a 2. Academic
researchers can include, but are not limited to, professors, teachers, instructors, historians,
scientists and students. These types of people collect information with the intent to add to
existing knowledge. If the law does not protect academic researchers, mark a 0.
27. COVERS11
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects issue activists, mark a 2. Issue activists include
people who are associated with an interest or issue. These people are often pursuing
specific goals. An activist will typically be gathering information specifically on the
interest or issue with the intent to publish with a particular agenda. If the law does not
protect issue activists, mark a 0.
28. COVERS 12
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects documentary filmmakers, mark a 2.
Documentary filmmakers are people who are collecting information to create a record of
an event or to explore an issue in-depth. Documentary filmmakers typically use several
interviews to gain the information they need. If the law does not protect documentary
filmmakers, mark a 0.

83

29. COVERS13
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects other groups of people not previously
mentioned, mark a 2. Please write the type of person protected on the coding sheet. If the
law does not cover any groups beyond what has already been coded, mark a 0.
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Appendix B: Coding Results
Results of coding for the source of journalist’s privilege.
First
State
State
Amendment
Constitution
State Statute
Alabama
No
No
Yes
Alaska
No
No
Yes
Arizona
Yes
No
Yes
Arkansas
No
No
Yes
California
Yes
Yes
Yes
Colorado
No
No
Yes
Connecticut
No
No
Yes
Delaware
No
No
Yes
Florida
Yes
No
Yes
Georgia
No
No
Yes
Hawaii
No
No
No
Idaho
Yes
Yes
No
Illinois
Yes
No
Yes
Indiana
No
No
Yes
Iowa
Yes
Yes
No
Kansas
Yes
No
Yes
Kentucky
No
No
Yes
Louisiana
Yes
Yes
Yes
Maine
Yes
No
Yes
Maryland
No
No
Yes
Massachusetts
No
No
No
Michigan
No
No
Yes
Minnesota
No
No
Yes
Mississippi
No
No
No
Missouri
Yes
No
No
Montana
No
No
Yes
Nebraska
No
No
Yes
Nevada
No
No
Yes
New Hampshire
Yes
Yes
No
New Jersey
No
No
Yes
New Mexico
No
No
No
New York
Yes
Yes
Yes
North Carolina
No
No
Yes
North Dakota
No
No
Yes
Ohio
No
No
Yes
Oklahoma
Yes
No
Yes
Oregon
No
No
Yes
Pennsylvania
Yes
No
Yes
Rhode Island
No
No
Yes
South Carolina
No
No
Yes
South Dakota
No
No
No
Tennessee
No
No
Yes
Texas
Yes
No
Yes
Utah
No
No
No
Vermont
Yes
No
No
Virginia
Yes
No
No
Washington
No
No
Yes
West Virginia
Yes
Yes
Yes
Wisconsin
Yes
Yes
Yes
Wyoming
No
No
No

Common Law
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

Index
Score
2
2
4
2
6
2
2
2
4
2
0
6
4
2
4
4
2
6
4
2
2
2
2
0
2
2
2
2
4
2
2
6
2
2
2
4
2
4
2
2
2
2
4
2
2
2
4
6
6
0
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Results of coding for scope of privilege protections.
Confidential
Unpublished
Source
Information
State
Alabama
Yes
No
Alaska
Yes
No
Arizona
Yes
No
Arkansas
Yes
No
California
Yes
Yes
Colorado
Yes
Yes
Connecticut
Yes
Yes
Delaware
Yes
Yes
Florida
Yes
Yes
Georgia
Yes
Yes
Hawaii
No
No
Idaho
Yes
No
Illinois
Yes
Yes
Indiana
Yes
No
Iowa
Yes
Yes
Kansas
Yes
Yes
Kentucky
Yes
No
Louisiana
Yes
Yes
Maine
Yes
No
Maryland
Yes
Yes
Massachusetts
Yes
No
Michigan
Yes
Yes
Minnesota
Yes
Yes
Mississippi
No
No
Missouri
Yes
No
Montana
Yes
Yes
Nebraska
Yes
Yes
Nevada
Yes
Yes
New Hampshire
Yes
No
New Jersey
Yes
Yes
New Mexico
Yes
No
New York
Yes
Yes
North Carolina
Yes
Yes
North Dakota
Yes
Yes
Ohio
Yes
No
Oklahoma
Yes
Yes
Oregon
Yes
Yes
Pennsylvania
Yes
Yes
Rhode Island
Yes
No
South Carolina
Yes
Yes
South Dakota
Yes
No
Tennessee
Yes
Yes
Texas
Yes
Yes
Utah
Yes
Yes
Vermont
Yes
No
Virginia
Yes
No
Washington
Yes
Yes
West Virginia
Yes
Yes
Wisconsin
Yes
Yes
Wyoming
No
No

Non-Confidential
Source
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Personal
Observations
No
No
No
No
Yes
Maybe
No
Maybe
Maybe
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Maybe
No
No
Maybe
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Index
Score
4
4
2
4
8
7
6
7
7
6
0
2
6
2
4
6
4
6
2
6
2
6
6
0
2
6
6
6
2
7
2
6
7
6
4
6
6
6
2
6
2
6
6
4
4
2
6
6
6
0
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Results of coding for situations when privilege applies.
Investigatory Legislative
Criminal
State
Subpoenas
Hearings
Defendants
Alabama
Absolute
Absolute
Absolute
Alaska
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Arizona
Absolute
Absolute
Absolute
Arkansas
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
California
Absolute
Absolute
Qualified
Colorado
Qualified
None
Qualified
Connecticut
None
Qualified
Qualified
Delaware
Absolute
Absolute
Qualified
Florida
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Georgia
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Hawaii
None
None
None
Idaho
Qualified
None
Qualified
Illinois
None
None
Qualified
Indiana
Absolute
Absolute
Qualified
Iowa
None
None
None
Kansas
None
Qualified
Qualified
Kentucky
Absolute
Absolute
Absolute
Louisiana
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Maine
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Maryland
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Massachusetts
Qualified
None
Qualified
Michigan
Absolute
None
Qualified
Minnesota
Qualified
Absolute
Qualified
Mississippi
None
None
None
Missouri
None
None
None
Montana
Absolute
None
Absolute
Nebraska
Absolute
Absolute
Absolute
Nevada
Absolute
Absolute
Qualified
New Hampshire
None
None
Qualified
New Jersey
Absolute
Absolute
Qualified
New Mexico
Qualified
None
Qualified
New York
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
North Carolina
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
North Dakota
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Ohio
Absolute
Absolute
Qualified
Oklahoma
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Oregon
Absolute
Absolute
Qualified
Pennsylvania
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Rhode Island
Qualified
None
Qualified
South Carolina
None
Qualified
Qualified
South Dakota
None
None
None
Tennessee
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Texas
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Utah
None
None
Qualified
Vermont
None
None
Qualified
Virginia
None
None
Qualified
Washington
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
West Virginia
Qualified
None
Qualified
Wisconsin
Qualified
Absolute
Qualified
Wyoming
None
None
None

Non-Party Civil
Litigation
Absolute
Qualified
Absolute
Qualified
Absolute
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
None
Qualified
Qualified
Absolute
Qualified
Qualified
Absolute
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Absolute
None
None
Absolute
Absolute
Absolute
Qualified
Absolute
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Absolute
Qualified
Absolute
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
None
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
None
None
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
None

Defamation
Litigation
Absolute
Qualified
Absolute
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
None
None
Qualified
Qualified
Absolute
None
Qualified
Absolute
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
Qualified
None
Qualified
Absolute
Absolute
Absolute
Qualified
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Results of coding for who can invoke journalist’s privilege.
Type of journalist

States

Newspaper employees: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West, Virginia, Wisconsin
Other print media employees: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin
Television media employees: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
Radio media employees: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
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Type of journalist

States

Internet-only media employees: Arkansas, California, Florida, Kansas, Maryland,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, Washington
Freelance journalists: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin
Independent bloggers: No states
Student journalists: Maryland, West Virginia
Book authors: Connecticut, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas,
Washington, Wisconsin
Academic researchers: Delaware, Texas
Issue activists: California
Documentary filmmakers: Alaska, Illinois, Louisiana
Other potential journalists: New Jersey
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Appendix C: Journalist’s Privilege by State
Alabama
State Shield Statute:
Ala. Code § 12-21-142 (2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege.
Description:
Alabama’s shield statute provides an absolute privilege for journalists to protect
sources of published information.210 The statute does not distinguish between confidential
and non-confidential sources. The statute provides protection in any legal proceeding or
trial and before any court, grand jury, tribunal, or legislative committee.211 The statute
grants protection to journalists for newspapers, radio stations, and television news
stations.212 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit construed the
statute very literally when it refused to provide protection to a magazine reporter.213 The
Alabama state appellate courts have not interpreted the shield statute. The state appellate
courts have also not addressed whether a basis for journalist’s privilege is found in the
First Amendment or state constitution. Alabama falls within the jurisdiction of the
Eleventh Circuit which has recognized a qualified journalist’s privilege in the First
Amendment.214

210

ALA. CODE §12-21-142.
Id.
212
Id.
213
Price v. Time, 416 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005).
214
See Id.
211
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Alaska
State Shield Statute:
Alaska Stat. § 09.25.300 – 09.25.390 (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
Coney v. State, 699 P.2d 899 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985)
Description:
Alaska’s state statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists to protect a
“source of information”215 used while acting in the course of their duties as a journalist.
The privilege can be overturned if the journalist’s lack of testimony would “result in the
miscarriage of justice or the denial of a fair trial to those who challenge the privilege”216
or “be contrary to the public interest.”217 The only state appellate court case to discuss
journalist’s privilege, Coney v. State, stated that “a newspaper reporter’s privilege is
limited and must give way to more important constitutional values, such as a defendant’s
right to a fair trial.”218The appellate court held that the trial judge did not err in refusing
to require a journalist to provide testimony to a criminal defendant in that particular
situation, though.

215

ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.300
ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.310
217
Id.
218
Coney v. State, 699 P.2d 899, 902 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985)
216
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Arizona
State Shield Statute:
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2237 (LexisNexis 2013)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-2214 (LexisNexis 2013) (describes the requirements for subpoena of
media witnesses)
State Cases Analyzed:
Flores v. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co., 218 Ariz. 52, 178 P.3d 1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008)
State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 94 P.3d 1119, (Ariz., 2004)
Matera v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 170 Ariz. 446, 825 P.2d 971
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)
Bartlett v. Superior Court In and For Pima County, 150 Ariz. 178, 722 P.2d 346 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986).
Description:
Arizona’s shield statute provides an absolute privilege for journalists to protect
confidential sources of information. The statute does not provide protection for nonconfidential sources. The statute also states that the absolute privilege to protect
confidential sources applies in “a legal proceeding or trial or any proceeding whatever.”
The Arizona courts have refused to extend the privilege to a book author.219 The court
explained the plain language of the statute protects journalists only for newspapers, radio
and television.220 Journalists in Arizona also have a qualified privilege found in the First
Amendment. Once again, the privilege only applies to confidential sources of
information.221

219

Matera v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 170 Ariz. 446, 825 P.2d 971 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992)
220
Id.
221
See Id.; Bartlett v. Superior Court In and For Pima County, 150 Ariz. 178, 722 P.2d 346 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986).
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Arkansas
State Shield Statute:
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-85-510 (West 2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (Ark. 1978)
Description:
The Arkansas shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege. The
privilege can be overcome if a party can be shown that an article “was written, published,
or broadcast in bad faith, with malice, and not in the interest of the public welfare.”222
The statute also explicitly provides protection for journalists of Internet news.223 The
statute states that journalists cannot be required to disclose a source “to any grand jury or
to any other authority.” 224 The only case to address the statute stated that “any other
authority” includes both civil and criminal proceedings.225 The state appellate courts have
not addressed whether the privilege extends protections beyond a source of information.

California
222

ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-85-510.
Id.
224
Id.
225
Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (Ark. 1978).
223
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State Shield Statute:
Cal. Evid. Code § 1070 (2013)
Cal. Const. art. I § 2
State Cases Analyzed:
McGarry v. University of San Diego, 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007)
O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006)
People v. Vasco, 131 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
People v. Ramos, 34 Cal. 4th 137, 101 P.3d 478, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575 (Cal. 2005)
Fost v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 4th 724, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
Miller v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 883, 986 P.2d 170, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 384 (Cal. 1999)
Rancho Publication v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999)
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 79
Cal. Rptr. 2d 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
SCI-Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 4th 654, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997)
In re Willon, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1080, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
People v. Sanchez, 12 Cal. 4th 1, 906 P.2d 1129, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Cal. 1996)
People v. Von Villas, 10 Cal. App. 4th 201, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 809 P.2d 865, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90 (Cal. 1991)
New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98
(Cal. 1990)
Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (Cal. 1990)
Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988)
Dalitz v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985)
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (Cal. 1984)
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
Fisher v. Larsen, 138 Cal. App. 3d 627, 188 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979)
CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978)
Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
Farr. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)
Description:
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California’s shield statute and state constitution both provide journalists with
absolute protections for sources and unpublished information.226 The statute does not
grant a privilege, though. Rather, the statute prevents any authority from finding a
journalist in contempt for refusing to disclose information. The statute itself protects
traditional journalists. California state appellate courts have extended the privilege to
Internet journalists227 and the journalistic activities of issue activists.228 The California
Supreme Court has also stated that a journalist’s eyewitness observations in public are
protected from disclosure.229 In the same case, the court also stated a criminal defendant’s
constitutional rights to a fair trial could potentially overcome the absolute shield.230 In
criminal cases, though, journalists are absolutely protected from prosecutors seeking
information.231 As stated previously, the statute provides journalists immunity from
contempt charges. Therefore, journalists do not have much protection in defamation
cases. If a journalist refuses to disclose information, a court can use other sanctions, such
as a summary judgment, for a journalist’s failure to disclose information.232 The
California Supreme Court has also held that the First Amendment does provide
journalists with a qualified reporter’s privilege.233

226

CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070; CAL. CONST. art. I § 2.
O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
228
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 597
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
229
Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (Cal. 1990).
230
Id., at 765.
231
Miller v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 883, 986 P.2d 170, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 384 (Cal. 1999).
232
New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (Cal. 1990).
233
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (Cal. 1984).
227
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Colorado
State Shield Statute:
Colo. Rev. Stat. 13-90-119 (2012)
Colo. Rev. Stat. 24-72.5-101 – 106 (2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
Gordon v. Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106 (Colo., 2000)
Henderson v. People, 879 P.2d 383 (Colo., 1994)
People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo., 1993)
Gagnon v. District Court In and For Fremont County, 632 P.2d 567 (Colo., 1981)
Pankratz v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 199 Colo. 411, 609
P.2d 1101 (Colo., 1980)
Description:
The Colorado shield statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists to protect
news information. News information includes, but is not limited to, sources, observations,
documents, photographs and knowledge. The privilege does not apply to information
received at a press conference, published information, personal observations of crimes in
instances when no other witnesses are available, or personal observations of a class 1, 2,
or 3 felony.234 Also, the privilege is codified in two different statutes. C.R.S. 13-90-119
applies to judicial proceedings. A separate, similarly worded statute applies to
governmental administrative proceedings.235 The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that
there is no basis for journalist’s privilege found in the First Amendment or state
constitution.236 Although, a more recent decision implied that the First Amendment does
provide protection. The court did not make an explicit statement indicating as much.237

234

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72.5-101 – 106.
236
See Pankratz v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 199 Colo. 411, 609 P.2d 1101
(Colo. 1980); Gagnon v. District Court In and For Fremont County, 632 P.2d 567 (Colo. 1981).
237
Gordon v. Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106 (Colo. 2000).
235
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Connecticut
State Shield Statute:
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146t (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege.
Description:
The Connecticut shield statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists. The
statute protects both information and sources. Information can include notes, outtakes,
film or “other data of whatever sort in any medium.”238 The statute also provides
protection for news media that publish through electronic means. This provision would
likely protect Internet news media, but no state appellate court has addressed the issue.
The statute also states that confidentiality is not a requirement for protection. The
privilege also establishes a multi-step process to overturn the privilege. A party that
wants to issue a subpoena must first negotiate with the targeted news media to receive
requested information.239 If a deal is not made, then the party seeking a subpoena must
establish through other sources that a crime has occurred or a civil action can be
sustained. Then the party must establish that the information or identity of the source is
critical or necessary, not obtainable through other means, and there is an overriding
public interest in the disclosure.240 After all the steps, a court can then require a journalist
to testify. No state appellate courts have ruled on journalist’s privilege. One published
trial court decision did suggest that the First Amendment provides a journalist’s privilege
in the state.241

238

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t(a)(1).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t (c).
240
CONN. GEN. STAT. §52-146t(d).
241
Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Fagin, 33 Conn. Supp. 204, 370 A.2d 1095 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1976).
239
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Delaware
State Shield Statute:
Del.Code Ann. tit. 10 § 4320 to 4326 (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege.
Description:
The Delaware shield statute provides an absolute testimonial privilege for
journalists in nonadjudicative proceedings.242 The statute also provides a qualified
privilege in all adjudicative proceedings.243 The statute specifically states that grand jury
proceedings are not considered adjudicative proceedings. The statute also provides
protection for journalists, scholars, educators, polemicists, or any individual who meets a
minimum number of hours engaged in newsgathering activity. 244 In adjudicative
proceedings, journalists can invoke the privilege if they swear under oath that disclosure
would violate an agreement with the source so that the information could be obtained.
The journalist could also swear that disclosure would hinder the cultivation of source
relationships.245 The privilege for the content of information can be overturned if a judge
determines that the public interest of the testimony outweighs the public interest of the
maintenance of confidential information. Also, the privilege to protect the source or
content can be overturned if a preponderance of evidence shows that the reporter’s sworn
statement is false.246 No state appellate courts have specifically addressed the Delaware
shield statute or a constitutionally-based journalist’s privilege.

242

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4321.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4322.
244
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4320.
245
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4322.
246
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4323.
243
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Florida
State Shield Statute:
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.5015 (LexisNexis 2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
WTVJ-NBC 6 v. Shehadeh, 56 So. 3d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
TheStreet.com, Inc. v. Carroll, 20 So. 3d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
News-Journal Corp. v. Carson, 741 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
Ulrich v. Coast Dental Services, Inc., 739 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1999)
Morris Communications Corp. v. Frangie, 720 So. 2d 230 (Fla., 1998)
Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670 (Fla., 1998)
State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220 (Fla., 1998)
Morris Communications Corp. v Frangie, 704 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
Kidwell v. State, 696 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
Davis v. State, 692 So. 2d 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. State, 669 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
Tampa Television, Inc. v. Norman, 647 So. 2d 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
Investigation: Florida Statute 27.04, Subpoena of Roche v. State, 589 So. 2d 978 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
CBS, Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla., 1991)
Russell v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 570 So. 2d 979 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577 (Fla., 1990)
CBS, Inc. v. Cobb, 536 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
Miami Herald Pub.. Co., a Div. of Knight-Ridder, Inc. v. Morejon, 529 So. 2d 1204 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
Carroll Contracting, Inc. v. Edwards, 528 So. 2d 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722 (Fla., 1986)
Satz v. News and Sun-Sentinel Co., 484 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
Kridos v. Vinskus, 483 So. 2d 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 463 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
Johnson v. Bentley, 457 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
Tribune Co. v. Green, 440 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
Gadsden County Times, Inc. v. Horne, 426 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
Times Pub. Co. v. Burke, 375 So. 2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
Campus Communications, Inc. v. Freedman, 374 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla., 1976)
In re Tierney, 328 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
Laughlin v. State, 323 So. 2d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
Morgan v. State, 325 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
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Description:
The Florida shield statute provides journalists a qualified privilege to protect
sources and information.247 The statute defines professional journalists broadly but
specifically excludes book authors.248 A Florida appellate court has also recognized that
website publishers and Internet journalists are protected under the statutory privilege.249
The statute provides protection for both information and the identity of a source. It does
not make a distinction between confidential or non-confidential information. The statute
also specifically states that protection does not apply to physical evidence, eyewitness
observations or recordings of crimes.250 Journalists’ observations of non-criminal activity
are protected as long as the journalist was performing journalistic duties.251 A court can
overturn the qualified privilege if a party can demonstrate that the information sought is
relevant and material to unresolved issues in a proceeding, unavailable from other
sources, and a compelling interest exists to require disclosure.252 The Florida Supreme
Court has also specifically stated that the privilege applies in both criminal and civil
proceedings.253 The Florida Supreme Court has also found a basis for a qualified
reporter’s privilege in the First Amendment.254

247

FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2).
FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1).
249
TheStreet.com, Inc. v. Carroll, 20 So.3d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
250
News Journal Corp. v. Carson, 741 So.2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
251
Id.
252
FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2).
253
Morris Communications Corp. v. Frangie, 720 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1998).
254
Morgan v. State, 337 So.2d 951 (Fla. 1976).
248
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Georgia
State Shield Statute:
Ga. Code Ann. § 24-5-508 (2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 715 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)
In re Morris Communications Co., 258 Ga. App. 154, 573 S.E.2d 420 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002)
Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 251 Ga. App. 808, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001)
In re Paul, 270 Ga. 280, 513 S.E.2d 219 (Ga. 1999)
Nobles v. State, 201 Ga. App. 483, 411 S.E.2d 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)
Stripling v. State, 261 Ga. 1, 401 S.E.2d 500 (Ga. 1991)
Howard v. Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc., 259 Ga. 795, 387 S.E.2d 332 (Ga.
1990)
Vaughn v. State, 259 Ga. 325, 381 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1989)
Georgia Communications Corp. BA-145 v. Horne, 164 Ga. App. 227, 294 S.E.2d 725
(Ga. Ct. App. 1982)
Description:
Georgia’s shield statute provides journalists a qualified privilege to protect any
information gained during news gathering activities. The shield provides protections for
journalists at newspapers, radio stations, television stations, and magazines as well as
book authors. The statute also provides protection for people who publish through
electronic means.255 Thus, the statute likely protects Internet journalists, but a state
appellate court has not addressed the issue. The statute also specifically states that the
privilege only applies in situations where journalists are not a party.256 The Court of
Appeals of Georgia has stated that public policy does require a balancing test to
determine whether confidential sources must be revealed in defamation suits, though.257
The journalist’s privilege can be overturned when the requested information is material
and relevant, alternative means to gain the information is unavailable, and the
information is necessary to prepare for or present a case.258 The Georgia Supreme Court
has found that the statute applies whether the journalist’s information was confidential or
non-confidential.259 Finally, the Georgia appellate courts have not found a basis for a
journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment or Georgia state constitution.

255

GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508.
Id.
257
Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 251 Ga. App. 808, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
258
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508.
259
In re Paul, 270 Ga. 280, 513 S.E.2d 219 (Ga. 1999).
256
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Hawaii
State Shield Statute:
On June 30, 2013, the Hawaii shield statute expired because of a sunset clause. Hawaii
does not have a state shield statute.
State Cases Analyzed:
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege since 1964.
Description:
The Hawaii legislature enacted a shield statute in 2008. The statute included a
sunset clause that would cause the statute to expire unless the state legislature passed an
extension. The legislature did not come to an agreement on extending the shield statute
which caused it to expire on June 30, 2013.260 The Hawaii state appellate courts have not
addressed journalist’s privilege since 1961. In the 1961 case, the Hawaii Supreme Court
found that the First Amendment did not provide protection for confidential sources of
information.261 Hawaii falls under the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’
jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized a qualified journalist’s
privilege in the First Amendment.262

260

Jack Komperda, Hawaii Shield Law Will Expire after Lawmakers Unable to Reconcile Competing Bills,
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (May 3, 2013), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-lawresources/news/hawaii-shield-law-will-expire-after-lawmakers-unable-reconcile-compe.
261
In re Goodfader, 45. Haw. 317, 367 P.2d 472 (Haw., 1961).
262
See Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Idaho
State Shield Statute:
Idaho does not have a state shield statute.
State Cases Analyzed:
State v. Salsbury, 129 Idaho 307, 924 P.2d 208 (Idaho, 1996)
Matter of Contempt of Wright, 108 Idaho 418, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho, 1985)
Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560, 671 P.2d 473 (Idaho, 1983)
Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc., 101 Idaho 795, 623 P.2d 103
(Idaho, 1980).
Caldero v. Tribune Pub. Co., 98 Idaho 288, 565 P.2d 791 (Idaho, 1977)
Description:
Idaho has not enacted a state shield statute. The Idaho Supreme Court has found
the basis for a qualified journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment, Idaho Constitution,
and common law.263 The supreme court has addressed only the privilege in relation to
newspaper and television journalists. It has not specifically defined who is considered a
journalist. A court can overturn the qualified privilege if the party seeking information
meets all three prongs of Justice Stewart’s test laid out in Branzburg.264 The supreme
court has expressly stated that the type of case must play a factor during a balancing test.
In criminal cases that involve Sixth Amendment rights, disclosure should be more
heavily favored.265 The Idaho Supreme Court has also noted that most Idaho cases have
focused on confidential sources or confidential information. When confidentiality is not
at stake, the court has been hesitant to provide a privilege for journalists.266

263

Matter of Contempt of Wright, 108 Idaho 418, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985).
Id., at 423.
265
Id.
266
State v. Salsbury, 129 Idaho 307, 924 P.2d 208 (Idaho 1996).
264
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Illinois
State Shield Statute:
735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-901 – 5/8-909 (LexisNexis 2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
People v. Slover, 323 Ill. App. 3d 620, 753 N.E.2d 554, 257 Ill. Dec. 359 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001)
People v. Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill. 2d 177, 724 N.E.2d 901, 244 Ill. Dec. 13 (Ill. 2000)
Cukier v. American Medical Ass’n, 259 Ill. App. 3d 159, 630 N.E.2d 1198, 197 Ill. Dec.
74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
People v. Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 607 N.E.2d 1375, 180 Ill. Dec. 862 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993)
In re Arya, 226 Ill. App. 3d 848, 589 N.E.2d 832, 168 Ill. Dec. 432 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
In re Special Grand Jury Investigation of Alleged Violation of Juvenile Court Act, 104
Ill. 2d 419, 472 N.E.2d 450, 84 Ill. Dec. 490 (Ill., 1984)
People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d 167, 429 N.E.2d 483, 57 Ill. Dec. 585 (Ill.,
1981)
People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 412 N.E.2d 692, 45 Ill. Dec. 341
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
People v. Childers, 94 Ill. App. 3d 104, 418 N.E.2d 959, 49 Ill. Dec. 939 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981)
Description:
The Illinois shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to protect
the source of any information.267 The statute defines a source as “the person or means
from or through which the news or information was obtained.”268 An Illinois appellate
court has used this definition to extend protection beyond just the identity of a source.
The court found that photographs could also be considered a source of information.269
The statute also states that a reporter is considered any person engaged in collecting,
writing or editing news on a full or part-time basis that will be published in a news
medium. The statute does state that a news medium does include electronic
publication,270 but the state appellate courts have not addressed whether Internet
publications receive protection. A court can overturn the privilege if it decides that the
reporter’s information does not concern matters that state and federal law require to be
secret, such as educational or health records.The court must also find that other sources
are unavailable and disclosure is in the public interest. In defamation cases, the privilege
can be overturned if all other sources have been exhausted and the plaintiff’s need for the
information outweighs the public interest in the journalist’s protection of confidential
267
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sources.271 The Illinois Supreme Court has found that the public interest in the proper
operations of a grand jury is enough to overturn the qualified privilege.272 The court’s
holding casts doubt on whether journalist’s privilege could apply in any grand jury
situation.
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735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907.
People v. Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill.2d 177, 724 N.E.2d 901, 244 Ill. Dec. 13 (Ill. 2000).
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Indiana
State Shield Statute:
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-46-4-1 – 34-46-4-1 (LexisNexis 2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
In re Indiana Newspapers Inc., 963 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1998)
Klagiss v. State, 585 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Stearns v. Zulka, 489 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
Hitt v. State, 478 N.E.2d 65 (Ind. 1985)
Jamerson v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc., 469 N.E. 2d 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Bradley, 462 N.E.2d 1321 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
Shindler v. State, 166 Ind. App. 258, N.E.2d 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975)
Hestand v. State, 257 Ind. 191, N.E.2d 282 (Ind. 1971)
Lipps v. State, 254 Ind. 141, 258 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. 1970)
Description:
The Indiana shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to
protect confidential sources of information.273 The statute protects journalists working for
newspapers, periodicals, press associations, wire services, television stations, and radio
stations.274 The statute specifically states that it only protects sources of information. The
statute is not clear whether a journalist must promise confidentiality. The Indiana state
appellate courts have differed on whether the First Amendment provides a basis for a
journalist’s privilege. In a civil case, the Indiana Court of Appeals for the third district
found that First Amendment did provide journalists with a qualified privilege to protect
unpublished information.275 In a later criminal case, though, the Indiana Supreme Court
found that the journalists did not have a First Amendment basis for a journalist’s
privilege to protect unaired footage from a known source.276 The supreme court did not
address whether its decision would also apply to civil cases, thus, the case law is not
entirely settled.
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Iowa
State Shield Statute:
Iowa does not a have a state shield statute.
State Cases Analyzed:
Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Community College, 646 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa
2002)
Bell v. City of Des Moines, 412 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1987)
Lamberto v. Bown, 326 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1982)
Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977)
Description:
Iowa does not have a state shield statute. Rather, the Iowa Supreme Court has
recognized a journalist’s privilege through interpreting the Iowa Constitution and First
Amendment.277 The court has adopted a three-prong test to determine whether the
journalist’s privilege can be overturned. A court can overturn the privilege if a party can
show that the information is critical to the action or defense, other means to gain the
information have been exhausted, and the record shows that the action or defense is not
frivolous.278 The court has also specifically stated that privilege protects confidential
sources, unpublished information and journalist’s notes.279 The Iowa Supreme Court has
applied the privilege only in civil proceedings. It has suggested that the privilege does
apply in criminal proceedings, though.280 The court has not specifically defined who
qualifies as a journalist. Newspaper and television journalists have been able to invoke
the privilege successfully.
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Kansas
State Shield Statute:
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-480 – 60-485 (2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan., 1978)
Pennington v. Chaffee, 1 Kan. App. 2d 682, 573 P.2d 1099 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977)
Description:
The Kansas shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to protect
any information or the source of any information obtained during journalistic duties.281
The statute protects journalists for newspapers, magazines, news wire services, television
stations and radio stations. The statute also specifically protects online journals that
regularly gather and publish news.282 The statute protects journalists’ notes, photographs,
outtakes, tapes and other recordings.283 The shield statute also does not distinguish
between confidential and non-confidential information. A court can overturn the privilege
if the party seeking the information shows that the information is material and relevant,
unavailable through other means, and of compelling interest to the case.284 The Kansas
Supreme Court also found a limited privilege based in the First Amendment.285 The
protections found in the shield statute likely provide broader protections than what the
supreme court initially recognized.
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Kentucky
State Shield Statute:
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
The Lexington Herald-Leader Co. v. Beard, 690 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1985)
Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971)
Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970)
Description:
The Kentucky shield statute provides an absolute privilege for journalists to
protect a source of information.286 The statute does not make a distinction between
confidential or non-confidential sources. The statute also protects journalists in “any legal
proceeding or trial” as well as before a grand jury, the General Assembly, or any city or
county legislative body. The statute expressly protects only journalists working for
newspapers, radio, or television.287 The state appellate courts have not recognized a
journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment or state constitution. The appellate courts
have narrowly construed the shield statute to protect only the source from which
information was obtained. The shield statute does not protect the actual information
itself.288 Journalists also do not have a shield privilege when they personally witness the
commission of a crime.289 The Kentucky appellate courts have found that the shield
statute does not protect a journalist from being required to appear before a grand jury.290
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Louisiana
State Shield Statute:
La. Rev. Stat. § 45:1451 – 1459 (2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ridenhour), 520 So.2d 372 (La. 1988)
In re Burns, 484 So.2d 658 (La. 1986)
Becnel v. Lucia, 420 So. 2d 1173 (La. Ct. App. 1982)
Dumez v. Houma Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Bd., 341 So.2d 1206 (La. Ct.
App. 1977)
Description:
The Louisiana shield statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists to
protect the source of any information. The statute does not distinguish between
confidential or non-confidential sources.291 A party seeking to overturn the privilege must
provide a written statement to the journalist explaining why disclosure of a source is
required for the protection of the public’s interest. A court is then required to hear
testimony from all parties. After testimony, a court can decide whether disclosure is
essential to the public interest.292 The statute also provides a qualified privilege to
journalists for non-confidential news information. The privilege can be overturned if a
party can show the information wanted is highly material and relevant, critical to a
party’s claim, defense, or issue, and is not obtainable from any other sources.293 The
Louisiana Supreme Court also stated that a qualified privilege for journalists to protect
information is found in both the First Amendment and state constitution. Courts can make
an exception when the journalist has witnessed criminal activity.294 The supreme court
has also interpreted that state statute as protecting any information that could potentially
identify a source of information.295
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Maine
State Shield Statute:
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 16 § 61 (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
In re Letellier, 578 A.2d 722 (Me. 1990)
State v. Hohler, 543 A.2d 364 (Me. 1988)
Description:
Maine’s shield statute provides journalists with a qualified testimonial privilege to
protect confidential sources.296 The shield statute simply states that journalists receive
shield protection without specifically defining who is a journalist. The statute also
protects any information that identifies a confidential source or any information
journalists received in confidence while in a journalistic capacity.297 A court can require
disclosure of a confidential source after a multi-prong test. The identity of the source
must be material and relevant, must be critical to a claim or defense, is not obtainable
through other means, and an overriding public interest in disclosure must exist.298 In
criminal investigations or prosecution, the government must also show through other
sources that reasonable grounds exist to believe a crime has occurred. In civil
proceedings a party must also show through other sources that a prima facie cause of
action exists.299 Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court has acknowledged that the First
Amendment does provide protection through a case-by-case balancing test.300 The
potential harm to the free flow of information must be balanced against the need for the
requested information.301
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Maryland
State Shield Statute:
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
Forensic Advisors, Inc. v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 170 Md. App. 520, 907 A.2d 855
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006)
Prince George’s County v. Hartley, 150 Md. App. 581, 822 A.2d 537 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2003)
WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State, 300 Md. 233, 477 A.2d 776 (Md. 1984)
In re State of Cal. for Los Angeles County, Grand Jury Investigation, 57 Md. App. 804,
471 A.2d 1141 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413 (Md. 1983)
Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 43 Md. App. 560, 406 A.2d 652 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1979)
Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972)
State v. Sheridan, 248 Md. 320, 236 A.2d 18 (Md. 1967)
Description:
The Maryland shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to
protect sources and a qualified privilege to protect unpublished information.302 The
statute provides protection to traditional journalists as well as student journalists.303 A
Maryland appellate court has extended the privilege to Internet news media.304 The
statute states that journalists can protect sources whether or not a promise of
confidentiality was made.305 The court can overturn the privilege for unpublished
information if a party can show that the information is relevant to a significant legal
issue, could not be obtained through any other means, and disclosure is in the public’s
overriding interest.306 The statute states that a court cannot require a journalist to disclose
the source of any information.307 The Maryland state appellate courts have interpreted
journalist’s privilege only through the shield statute. The courts have not found an
additional basis for journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment or state constitution.
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Massachusetts
State Shield Statute:
Massachusetts does not have a state shield statute.
State Cases Analyzed:
Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, 442 Mass. 367, 822 N.E.2d 667 (Mass. 2005)
Wojcik v. Boston Herald, Inc., 60 Mass. App. Ct. 510, 803 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. App. Ct.
2004)
Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 706 N.E.2d 316 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1999)
Promulgation of Rules Regarding Protection of Confidential News Sources, 395 Mass.
164, 479 N.E.2d 154 (Mass. 1985)
Com. v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1, 438 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 1982)
Matter of Roche, 381 Mass. 624, 411 N.E.2d 466 (Mass. 1980)
Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1973)
In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971)
Description:
The Massachusetts legislature has not enacted a state shield statute. The state
appellate courts have also been reluctant to find a basis for a journalist’s privilege in the
First Amendment or state constitution. Rather, the courts have developed protections for
journalists through the common law. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
emphasized a balancing test between the public’s interest in the need of every person’s
evidence and the protection of the free flow of information.308 The court did not
specifically establish what factors must be considered in the balancing test. The situations
in which courts have granted protection for journalists have typically involved
confidential sources.309 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has found that
published information from a known source does not receive protection, though.310
Massachusetts state appellate courts have provided protection in the context of grand
juries,311 criminal proceedings,312 non-libel civil litigation313 and libel litigation when the
media was a party.314
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Michigan
State Shield Statute:
Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 767.5a (LexisNexis 2013) (statute for grand jury proceedings)
Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 767A.6 (LexisNexis 2013) (statute for investigatory
subpoenas from prosecutors)
State Cases Analyzed:
In re Subpoenas to News Media Practitioners, 240 Mich. App. 369, 613 N.W. 2d 342
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
Marketos v. American Employers Ins. Co., 185 Mich. App 179, 460 N.W.2d 272 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1990)
In re Contempt of Stone, 154 Mich. App. 121, 397 N.W.2d 244 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
Matter of Photo Marketing Ass’n Intern., 120 Mich. App. 527 327 N.W.2d 515 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1982)
Description:
Michigan’s shield statute provides a qualified privilege in grand jury proceedings
for journalists to protect informants.315 The statute also protects unpublished information
obtained from or relating to an informant. The statute does not distinguish between
confidential and non-confidential sources. The shield can be overturned in inquiries of
crimes with sentences of life imprisonment. In those situations, a court can require a
journalist to reveal information if it is essential to the proceeding and alternative sources
have been exhausted.316 Michigan also has a statute that protects journalists from
investigatory subpoenas that prosecutors have issued.317 The statute provides an absolute
privilege for journalists to protect sources in any inquiry using investigative subpoenas.
Journalists are required to reveal information only if it has been disseminated to the
public or the journalist is the subject of the inquiry.318 A Michigan appellate court has
applied the grand jury shield statute in civil proceedings. The court found that the statute
does not provide protection for non-confidential information in such cases. The statute
protects the identity of the informant as well as communications between a journalist and
informant.319 Michigan appellate courts have refused to find a basis for a journalist’s
privilege in the First Amendment or state constitution.
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Minnesota
State Shield Statute:
Minn. Stat. § 595.021 – 595.025 (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
In re Death Investigation of Skjervold, 742 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Involving File No. 17139, 720 N.W.2d 807
(Minn. 2006)
Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 2003)
Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 658 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
Bauer v. Gannett Co., Inc. (Kare 11), 557 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
State v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1996)
State v. Knutson, 539 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1995)
State v. Knutson, 523 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1994)
Heaslip v. Freeman, 511 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
State v. Brenner, 488 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
State v. Astleford, 323 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. Ct. App. 1982)
Description:
Minnesota’s shield statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists to protect
sources and unpublished information gathered during the course of journalistic work.320
The statute includes language that discusses the public policy intent of the statute. The
statute is intended to protect news media sources and unpublished information.321 The
statute does not distinguish between confidential and non-confidential sources or
information. The statute also states that the protections apply in courts, grand juries,
agency hearings and legislative proceedings.322 The statute does not specifically define
who is considered a journalist. The Minnesota Supreme Court did suggest that the
definition of a journalist can be very broad, though.323 A court can overturn the privilege
if a party can demonstrate all factors under a three-prong test. The first prong requires
one of two situations. A party must show there is probable cause that the information is
relevant to a gross misdemeanor or felony. If the information is relevant to only a
misdemeanor, the party must show that the information will not reveal the identity of the
source. The second prong requires that the information cannot be obtained through means
less destructive to First Amendment rights. The third prong requires that the party show a
compelling and overriding need for the information to prevent injustice.324 The
requirements to overturn the privilege in a defamation case are slightly different. A party
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seeking disclosure must show that the identity of the source will lead to evidence of
actual malice. A journalist will not be required to disclose the source of information
unless there is probable cause that the source has information relevant to the issue of
defamation and the information cannot be obtained through alternative means.325 The
Minnesota appellate courts have consistently declined to find a basis for a journalist’s
privilege in the First Amendment or state constitution.

325

MINN. STAT. §595.025.

116

Mississippi
State Shield Statute:
Mississippi does not have a state shield statute.
State Cases Analyzed:
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege.
Description:
Mississippi has not enacted a state shield statute. The Mississippi state appellate
courts have not addressed any journalist’s privilege issues. At least one federal district
court in Mississippi has stated that the First Amendment provides a basis for a qualified
journalist’s privilege.326 The court held that a journalist can only be required to reveal
unpublished information after a court balances First Amendment interests of a free press
against a defendant’s interest in obtaining information.327 Mississippi falls under the
jurisdiction of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit has
recognized a qualified journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment.328
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Missouri
State Shield Statute:
Missouri does not have a shield statute.
State Cases Analyzed:
State ex rel Classics III Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)
CBS Inc. (KMOX-TV) v. Campbell, 645 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
Description:
Missouri does not have a shield statute for journalists. Also, the state appellate
courts have addressed the issue only twice. In an 1982 case, the Missouri Court of
Appeals in the eastern district found that a television station could not refuse to disclose
unpublished information to a grand jury.329 The other case that focused on journalist’s
privilege was in the context of a libel suit against a magazine. The Missouri Court of
Appeals in the western district held that journalists did have a qualified privilege to
protect a confidential background source for an allegedly libelous article.330 The court
indicated that the foundation for a privilege could be based on the First Amendment.331
The court adopted a four-part balancing test for media defendants in a libel context. A
court must balance whether alternative sources have been exhausted, the importance of
protecting confidentiality under the circumstances, whether the information is crucial to
the plaintiff’s case, and whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of
defamation.332 The state appellate courts have not stated whether the privilege applies in
criminal proceedings. The Missouri appellate courts have not defined who is eligible for
the journalist’s privilege.
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Montana
State Shield Statute:
Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-901 – 26-1-903 (2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
State v. Slavin, 320 Mont. 425, 87 P.3d 495 (Mont. 2004)
Sible v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 224 Mont. 163, 729 P.2d 1271 (Mont. 1986)
State ex rel. Adams v. District Court of Third Judicial Dist., 169 Mont. 336, 546 P.2d 988
(Mont. 1976)
Description:
Montana’s shield statute provides an absolute privilege for journalists to protect
any sources or information used during the course of the journalist’s work.333 The statute
provides protections for journalists working for newspapers, magazines, press
associations, news agencies, news services, radio stations, television stations or
community antenna television services.334 The shield statute does not provide any
exceptions in which the privilege can be overturned. The statute also specifically states
that journalists can waive the privilege only if they voluntarily agree to or voluntarily
disclose the source during testimony.335 This section of the statute was likely amended
after a court found that a journalist waived the privilege after he simply agreed to provide
general testimony during a trial.336 The Montana appellate courts have not directly
addressed whether the absolute privilege conflicts with other constitutional rights. In the
only case touching on the matter, a district trial court dismissed a motion to require
journalist’s testimony in a criminal proceeding. The defendant stated that the excluded
testimony harmed his Sixth Amendment and Montana constitutional rights to compel
witnesses on his behalf. The Montana Supreme Court stated that even if the district court
had made an error, it was harmless because other testimony could provide similar
information.337
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Nebraska
State Shield Statute:
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-144 – 20-147 (2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege.
Description:
Nebraska’s shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to protect
both sources and unpublished information.338 The statute provides protection for
traditional journalists as well as book and pamphlet authors.339 The statute states that the
privilege applies in any judicial, executive, legislative or administrative hearing, or
investigation.340 The statute does not provide any exceptions. Nebraska’s state appellate
courts have not addressed journalist’s privilege.
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Nevada
State Shield Statute:
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49.275 (LexisNexis 2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
Diaz v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 116 Nev. 88, 993 P.2d 50
(Nev. 2000)
Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For Clark County, 104 Nev.
508, 761 P.2d 849 (Nev. 1998)
Newburn v. Howard Hughes Medical Institute, 95 Nev. 368, 594 P.2d 1146 (Nev. 1979)
Description:
The Nevada shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to
protect published and unpublished information as well as sources.341 The statute does not
distinguish between confidential and non-confidential information. The statute provides
protection from any court, grand jury, coroner’s inquest, legislature, department, agency,
commission or local governing body proceedings, trials or investigations.342 The statute
limits protections to journalists, former journalists, or editors of newspapers, periodicals
or press associations. The statute also provides protection to employees of any radio or
television station.343 The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as providing
an absolute privilege to journalists.344 The court did state, though, that situations might
exist in which the shield will have to yield to a criminal defendant’s opposing
constitutional rights.345 The Nevada state appellate courts have not specifically had a case
that addresses such an issue. The state appellate courts have interpreted only the state
statute as providing a journalist’s privilege rather than the First Amendment or state
constitution.
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New Hampshire
State Shield Statute:
New Hampshire does not have a state shield statute.
State Cases Analyzed:
Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc., 160 N.H. 227, 999
A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010)
State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1980)
Downing v. Monitor Pub. Co. Inc., 120 N.H. 383, 415 A.2d 683 (N.H. 1980)
Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 286, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977)
Description:
New Hampshire has not enacted a shield statute. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court has found a basis for a qualified reporter’s privilege to protect confidential sources
in both the First Amendment and state constitution.346 The court has also found that the
privilege applies in both criminal347 and civil proceedings.348 The privilege has not been
determined to extend beyond confidential sources because the supreme court has not
addressed a case in which other information was at stake. The supreme court has also
provided protection to newspaper journalists and a website publishing financial news.349
Journalists working for other news media would likely be protected, but no cases have
addressed the issue. The supreme court has also laid out different tests to overturn the
privilege depending on the context. In a criminal context, a court can overturn the
privilege if a defendant can show that all other reasonable means to gain the information
have been exhausted, the information is not irrelevant to a defense, and a reasonable
possibility exists that the information would affect the verdict.350 In defamation suit, a
plaintiff must provide evidence that “there is a genuine issue of fact regarding the falsity
of the publication.”351 In civil suits where the news media is not a party, the court can
overturn the privilege after conducting a balancing test that weighs the plaintiff’s asserted
need of information against the free flow of information.352
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See State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 258, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1980).
Id.
348
See Downing v. Monitor Pub. Co. Inc., 120 N.H. 383, 415 A.2d 683 (N.H. 1980); Opinion of the
Justices, 117 N.H. 286, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977).
349
See Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc., 160 N.H. 227, 999 A.2d 184
(N.H. 2010).
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State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H.,1980).
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Downing v. Monitor Pub. Co. Inc., 120 N.H. 383, 387, 415 A.2d 683 (N.H. 1980)
352
Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc., 160 N.H. 227, 236, 999 A.2d 184
(N.H. 2010).
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New Jersey
State Shield Statute:
N.J. Stat. § 2A:84A-21 – 2A:84A-21.8 (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 20 A.3d 364 (N.J. 2011)
Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 413 N.J. Super. 135, 993 A.2d 845 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2008)
Trump v. O’Brien, 403 N.J. Super. 281, 958 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)
Senna v. Florimont, 196 N.J. 469, 958 A.2d 457 (N.J. 2008)
In re Venezia, 191 N.J. 259, 922 A.2d 1263 (N.J. 2007)
Kinsella v. NYT Television, 370 N.J. Super. 311, 851 A.2d 105 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2004)
Kinsella v. Welch, 362 N.J. Super. 143, 827 A.2d 325 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000)
Petition of Burnett, 269 N.J. Super. 493, 635 A.2d 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993)
Gastman v. North Jersey Newspapers Co., 254 N.J. Super. 140, 603 A.2d 111 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
State v. Santiago, 250 N.J. Super. 30, 593 A.2d 357 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)
Matter of Woodhaven Lumber and Mill Work, 123 N.J. 481, 589 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1991)
In re Schuman, 114 N.J. 14, 552 A.2d 602 (N.J. 1989)
In re Schuman, 222 N.J. Super. 387, 537 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)
In re Avila, 206 N.J. Super. 61, 501 A.2d 1018 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)
Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1982)
Resorts Intern., Inc. v. NJM Associates, 180 N.J. Super. 459, 435 A.2d 572 (N.J. Super.
Law Div. 1981)
Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena of Fawn Vrazo, 176 N.J. Super. 455, 423 A.2d 695 (N.J.
Super. Law Div. 1980)
State v. Boiardo, 83 N.J. 350, 416 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1980)
State v. Boiardo, 82 N.J. 446, 414 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1980)
Matter of Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J. 1978)
In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972)
Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing & Pub. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (N.J.
Super. Law Div., 1964)
Description:
The New Jersey Shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to
protect sources and information.353 The statute provides protection for traditional
journalists as well as information published through “other similar printed, photographic,
mechanical or electronic means.”354 The New Jersey state appellate courts have found the

353
354

N.J. STAT. § 2A:84A-21.
N.J. STAT. § 2A:84A-21a.
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privilege extends to book authors,355 Internet journalists,356 and publishers of an annual
report rating insurers.357 The statute provides protection to journalists in any legal
proceeding, quasi-legal proceeding, or before an investigative body.358 The statute does
not distinguish between whether the information is confidential and non-confidential. The
only exceptions the statute makes are for when journalists intentionally conceal their
identities or are eyewitnesses to an act that involves physical violence or property
damage.359 The New Jersey Supreme Court viewed the exception narrowly when it
refused to require journalists to provide photographs of a burning building.360 The court
held that journalists could be required to testify only if they personally witness the act
itself.361 The supreme court has held that the absolute privilege could fall when it
conflicts with a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.362 A court can overturn the
privilege if a criminal defendant shows that the information was material and relevant,
unavailable from other sources, and legitimately needed to see and use it.363 In
defamation actions, though, the supreme court held that the shield statute was absolute.364
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Trump v. O’Brien, 403 N.J. Super. 281, 958 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
See Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 233, 20 A.3d 364, 378 (N.J. 2011).
357
Petition of Burnett, 269 N.J. Super. 493, 635 A.2d 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
358
N.J. STAT. § 2A:84A-21.
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N.J. STAT. § 2A:84A-21a(h).
360
Matter of Woodhaven Lumber and Mill Work, 123 N.J. 481, 589 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1991).
361
Id., at 488.
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Matter of Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J. 1978).
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Id., at 276-277.
364
Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1982).
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New Mexico
State Shield Statute:
Rule 11-514 NMRA (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (N.M. 1982)
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976)
Description:
New Mexico journalists have a qualified testimonial privilege under Rule 11-514
of New Mexico’s Rules of Evidence.365 The rule states that journalists have a privilege to
refuse to testify about confidential sources or confidential information obtained in the
course of journalistic duties.366 The rule protects journalists who work for “newspapers,
magazines, press associations, news agencies wire services, radio or television or other
similar printed, photographic, mechanical or electronic means of disseminating news to
the public.”367 Journalists working for Internet news could possibly fall under this
definition, but no court decision has addressed the issue. A court can overturn the
privilege if a party can show that a journalist has confidential information that is material
and relevant, all other sources of gaining the information have been exhausted, the
information is crucial to the case of the party, and the need of the information outweighs
the public interest protecting the information and sources.368 The source of the shield is in
the New Mexico rules of evidence because the state supreme court declared the
legislatively enacted shield statute unconstitutional because the legislature did not have
the constitutional power to dictate judicial rules.369 The supreme court then promulgated
a testimonial privilege for journalists into the state’s rules of evidence. The New Mexico
legislature’s original enactment does remain in the books.370 The New Mexico courts
have not found a journalist’s privilege in either the First Amendment or state constitution.

365

Rule 11-514 NMRA 2013.
Id., at (B).
367
Id., at (A)(6).
368
Id., at (C).
369
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976).
370
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (2012).
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New York
State Shield Statute:
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
Perito v. Finklestein, 51 A.D.3d 674, 856 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
People v. Combest, 4 N.Y.3d 341, 828 N.E.2d 583, 795 N.Y.S.2d 481 (N.Y. 2005)
Emerson v. Port, 303 A.D.2d 229, 757 N.Y.S.2d 18 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
Flynn v. NYP Holdings Inc., 235 A.D.2d 907, 654 N.Y.S.2d 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
Application of CBS Inc., 232 A.D.2d 291, 648 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, 228 A.D.2d 187, 643 N.Y.S.2d 92 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996)
Application of Codey, 183 A.D.2d 126, 589 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
Sands v. News America Pub. Inc., 161 A.D.2d 30, 560 N.Y.S.2d 416 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990)
O’Neill v. Oakgrove Const., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 523 N.E.2d 277, 528 N.Y.S.2d 595
(N.Y. 1988)
Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 70 N.Y.2d 151, 511 N.E.2d 116, 518
N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. 1987)
O’Neill v. Oakgrove Const., Inc., 122 A.D. 2d 570, 505 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986)
In re Penzoil Co., 108 A.D.2d 666, 485 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
Beach v. Shanley, 63 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. 1984)
People v. Korkala, 99 A.D.2d 161, 472 N.Y.S.2d 310 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
Oak Beach Inn Corp. v. Babylon Beacon, Inc., 92 A.D.2d 102, 459 N.Y.S.2d 819 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1983)
Matter of Beach v. Shanley, 94 A.D.2d 542, 466 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
Hennigan v. Buffalo Courier Exp. Co., Inc., 85 A.D.2d 924, 466 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981)
Greenleigh Associates, Inc. v. New York Post Corp., 79 A.D.2d 588, 434 N.Y.S.2d 388
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
People v. LeGrand, 67 A.D.2d 446, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 A.D.2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973)
People v. Dan, 41 A.D.2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973)
People v. Wolf, 39 A.D.2d 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972)
Description:
The New York shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to
protect confidential information.371 The statute also provides a qualified privilege to
protect non-confidential news.372 The statute provides protection for traditional
371
372

N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b).
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c).
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journalists as well as people working for any “other professional medium or agency.”373
The New York state appellate courts have stated that the statute extends protection to
book authors.374 A New York trial court has extended the statute to protect Internet
journalists.375 The statute provides journalists with protection in any civil, criminal, grand
jury or legislative proceedings.376 A New York appellate court has held that the statute
provides protection for journalist’s eyewitness observations.377 A court can overturn the
privilege for non-confidential information if a party shows that the journalist’s
information is highly material or relevant, necessary to the maintenance of a claim or
defense, and is unavailable from other sources.378 The statute protects journalists only
from contempt.379 A court could potentially use other sanctions, such as summary
judgment, in defamation cases. New York Appellate courts have recognized a basis for a
qualified journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment and state constitution.380
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N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6).
Perito v. Finklestein, 51 A.D.3d 674, 856 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
375
Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Eavis, 37 Misc. 3d 1058, 955 N.Y.S.2d 715, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 22310
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
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Beach v. Shanley, 63 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. 1984).
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Id.
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See O’Neill v. Oakgrove Const., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 523 N.E.2d 277, 528 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. 1988).
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North Carolina
State Shield Statute:
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.11 (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
In re Owens, 128 N.C. App. 577, 496 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)
Description:
The North Carolina shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to
protect confidential and non-confidential information in any legal proceeding.381 The
statute specifically includes any grand jury proceeding or investigation, criminal
prosecution or civil suit in its definition of legal proceeding.382 The statute states that a
news medium is any entity that publishes or distributes news through print, broadcast, or
electronic means.383 The definition likely covers journalists working for Internet news
organizations, but a court has not specifically addressed the issue. To overcome the
privilege, a party seeking the journalist’s information must establish that the information
is relevant and material, cannot be obtained through alternative sources, and is essential
to the maintenance of a claim or defense.384 The North Carolina appellate courts have not
interpreted the shield statute. The only case focusing on a journalist’s privilege occurred
before the legislature enacted the statute. In that case, the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina refused to recognize a journalist’s privilege for non-confidential information
from a non-confidential source.385
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N.C. GEN. STAT § 8-53.11(B).
N.C. GEN. STAT § 8-53.11(A)(2).
383
N.C. GEN. STAT § 8-53.11(A)(3).
384
N.C. GEN. STAT § 8-53.11(c).
385
In re Owens, 128 N.C. App. 577, 496 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
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North Dakota
State Shield Statute:
N.D. Cent. Code § 31-01-06.2 (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
Grand Forks Herald v. District Court in and for Grand Forks County, 322 N.W.2d (N.D.
1982)
Description:
The North Dakota shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to
protect sources or any information in any proceeding or hearing.386 The statute does not
distinguish between confidential and non-confidential information. The statute requires
that the journalists must have gained the information while working. The journalist must
also be working for or acting for an organization that publishes or broadcasts news. The
privilege can be overturned if a district court finds that a lack of disclosure will result in a
miscarriage of justice.387 The statute does not specifically explain what a district court
must consider. In interpreting the statute, the North Dakota Supreme Court provided
several aspects that a district court must consider. The supreme court factors included
whether the information was confidential, whether all other possible sources had been
exhausted, and whether a compelling interest existed. The court stated that the type of
proceeding should be considered as well as whether the action or suit was patently
frivolous.388 Overall, a district court must balance a variety of factors rather than using a
uniformly established test. The North Dakota courts have not found a basis for a
journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment or state constitution.
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N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2013).
Id.
388
Grand Forks Herald v. District Court in and for Grand Forks County, 322 N.W.2d (N.D. 1982).
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Ohio
State Shield Statute:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.11 – 2739.12 (LexisNexis 2013) (shield for newspaper
journalists)
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.04 (LexisNexis 2013) (shield for broadcast journalists)
State Cases Analyzed:
Svoboda v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 156 Ohio App. 3d 307, 805 N.E.2d 559
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
In re April 7, 1999 Grand Jury Proceedings, 140 Ohio App. 3d 755, 749 N.E.2d 325
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
In re Grand Jury Witness Subpoena of Abraham, 92 Ohio App. 3d 186, 634 N.E.2d 667
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
State ex rel. Nat. Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas of Lake County, 52
Ohio St. 3d 104, 556 N.E.2d 1120 (Ohio 1990)
State v. Geis, 2 Ohio App. 3d 258, 411 N.E.2d 803 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)
Matter of McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 408 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979)
Description:
The Ohio shield statute grants journalists an absolute privilege to protect the
identity of sources.389 The shield is divided between two different statutes. One statute
protects newspaper journalists390 while the other protects broadcast journalists.391 The
statutes do not distinguish between confidential or non-confidential sources. The statute
provides protection to journalists in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation.392 The
Ohio state appellate courts have not recognized a journalist’s privilege in the First
Amendment or state constitution. An Ohio state appellate court has found that the statute
is limited to only the source of information.393 Another state appellate court has
protected information that could lead to the identity of a source, though.394 A state
appellate court stated that the absolute privilege could fall if it conflicts with a criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights.395 When the statute and constitutional rights conflict,
the criminal defendant must show that the journalist’s information can provide relevant
evidence of guilt or innocence.396
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12.
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State v. Geis, 2 Ohio App. 3d 258, 411 N.E.2d 803 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
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2000).
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Id., at 22.
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Oklahoma
State Shield Statute:
Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2506 (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
Taylor v. Miskovsky, 640 P.2d 959 (Okl. 1981)
Description:
The Oklahoma shield statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists to
protect both sources and unpublished information in state proceedings.397 The statute
defines state proceedings as any investigation or judicial, legislative, executive or
administrative proceeding.398 The statute protects traditional journalists as well as book
authors.399 The statute does not make a distinction between confidential and nonconfidential sources. The statute also specifically states that the privilege does not apply
to allegedly defamatory information in proceedings which a defendant asserts a defense
based on the information.400 A court can overturn the privilege if a party establishes that
the information or source’s identity is relevant to a significant issue and could not be
discovered through alternative means.401 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has found a basis
for a qualified reporter’s privilege in the First Amendment.
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OKL. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(B).
OKL. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(A)(1).
399
OKL. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(A)(2).
400
OKL. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(B).
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OKL. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(B)(2).
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Oregon
State Shield Statute:
Or. Rev. Stat. § 44.510 – 44.530 (2011)
State Cases Analyzed:
Brown v. Gatti, 195 Or. App. 695, 99 P.3d 299 (Or. Ct. App. 2004)
State v. Pelham, 136 Or. App. 336, 901 P.2d 972 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)
State ex rel. Meyers v. Howell, 86 Or. App. 570, 740 P.2d 792 (Or. Ct. App. 1987)
McNabb v. Oregonian Pub. Co., 69 Or. App. 136, 685 P.2d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 1984)
State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (Or. 1968)
Description:
The Oregon shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to
protect sources and unpublished information.402 The statute protects traditional journalists
as well as book authors.403 The statute protects journalists from testifying before any
executive, legislative, or judicial body.404 The statute also prohibits authorities from
conducting searches of journalists’ papers or work areas unless probable cause exists to
believe that the journalist has committed or will commit a crime.405 The statute does
provide one exception in the case of defamation actions. Journalists are not allowed to
withhold the name of a source or information if they are using the information as the
basis for a defense.406 The state appellate courts have interpreted journalist’s privilege
only through the statute. The Oregon Supreme Court has declined to find a basis in the
First Amendment for journalist’s privilege.407 A court of appeals stated that the absolute
privilege can be overcome when it is in conflict with a criminal defendant’s constitutional
rights of compulsory process.408 In such situations, criminal defendants can overcome the
privilege if they show that the journalist’s information would be both material and
favorable to a defense.409
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OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520.
OR. REV. STAT. § 44.510(2).
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OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(1).
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Pennsylvania
State Shield Statute:
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5942 (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
In re Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand Jury, 610 Pa. 296, 19 A.3d 491 (Pa.
2011)
Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 598 Pa. 283, 956 A.2d 937 (Pa. 2008)
Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 916 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 576 Pa. 151, 838 A.2d 648 (Pa. 2003)
Commonwealth v. Tyson, 800 A.2d 327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
Davis v. Glanton, 705 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)
McMenamin v. Tartaglione, 139 Pa. Commw. 269, 590 A.2d 802 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)
Sprague v. Walter, 518 Pa. 425, 543 A.2d 1078 (Pa. 1988)
Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1987)
Sprague v. Walter, 357 Pa. Super. 570, 516 A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
Description:
The Pennsylvania shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to
protect sources.410 The statute provides protection for traditional journalists. Journalists
retain the privilege in any governmental legal proceeding, trial, or investigation.411
Although the statute does not make a distinction between confidential and nonconfidential sources, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that statutory
protection applies only to confidential sources.412 Pennsylvania state appellate courts
have recognized a basis in the First Amendment for a qualified journalist’s privilege to
protect information other than the source.413 A court can overturn the privilege if the
party seeking the information can show that it is material, relevant, and necessary,
unavailable through other means, and crucial to the case.414 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has not directly ruled whether the First Amendment provides journalists a
testimonial privilege.415
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42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942.
Id.
412
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 576 Pa. 151, 838 A.2d 648 (Pa. 2003).
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See McMenamin v. Tartaglione, 139 Pa. Commw. 269, 590 A.2d 802 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); Davis v.
Glanton, 705 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
414
McMenamin ,at 287.
415
See Bowden, footnote 10, at 753.
411

133

Rhode Island
State Shield Statute:
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19.1-2 – 9-19.1-3 (2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
Giuliano v. Providence Journal Co., 704 A.2d 220 (R.I. 1997)
Lett v. Providence Journal Co., 703 A.2d 1125 (R.I. 1997)
Outlet Communications, Inc. v. State, 588 A.2d 1050 (R.I. 1991)
Capuano v. Outlet Co., 579 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1990)
Description:
The Rhode Island shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to
protect confidential information and sources.416 The statute protects journalists working
for newspapers, periodicals, press associations, newspaper syndicates, wire services,
radio stations and television stations.417 The statute provides protection only when the
information or source is confidential.418 The statute provides protection before any court,
grand jury, agency, department, or commission.419 The statute does provide several
conditions for the privilege.420 The statute does not apply to any information that has
been made public, in cases in which a defamation defendant asserts a defense based on
the source of information, or to information about the details of any grand jury or other
secret proceeding.421 A court can overturn the privilege if a party can show that
disclosure of the source of information is necessary to allow a criminal prosecution of a
specific felony or to prevent a threat to human life. The party must also show that the
information is not available from other witnesses.422 The Rhode Island Supreme court has
refused to find a privilege based in the First Amendment or state constitution.
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R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2.
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Outlet Communications, Inc. v. State, 588 A.2d 1050 (R.I. 1991).
419
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2.
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South Carolina
State Shield Statute:
S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-100 (2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
In re Decker, 322 S.C. 215, 471 S.E.2d 462 (S.C., 1995)
Description:
South Carolina’s shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to
protect information.423 The statute provides protection for traditional journalists as well as
book authors.424 The statute does not distinguish between confidential and nonconfidential information. A court can overturn the privilege if the party seeking
information can show that the information is material and relevant, unavailable through
other means, and necessary to the preparation or presentation of the case.425 The South
Carolina appellate courts have not recognized a basis for journalist’s privilege other than
the statute. In the only case on journalist’s privilege, the South Carolina Supreme Court
required a journalist to disclose information to a trial court judge.426 The supreme court
stated that the statute only prevented parties in a case from gaining information from
journalists. The trial court was not a party in the case, so disclosure needed to take
place.427
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South Dakota
State Shield Statute:
South Dakota does not have a state shield statute.
State Cases Analyzed:
Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broadcasting Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 1995)
Description:
South Dakota has not enacted a state shield statute. The South Dakota state
appellate courts have considered journalist’s privilege only once.428 At issue in the case
was whether a television station and journalist needed to disclose the name of a
confidential source in a libel suit. The South Dakota Supreme Court determined that
journalists do have a qualified testimonial privilege in civil litigation to protect
confidential sources.429 The supreme court established a five factor test to determine
when a court could overturn the privilege. The factors included the nature of the
litigation, the relevancy of the information, the existence of alternative sources, the
importance of confidentiality, and whether the journalist’s statements were false.430 The
supreme court stressed that the decision was limited to civil litigation only. The case
focused on a television journalist. Other traditional journalists would likely have
protection but the state appellate courts have not discussed the privilege in other contexts.
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Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broadcasting Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 1995).
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Tennessee
State Shield Statute:
Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-208 (2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
State v. Kendrick, 178 S.W.3d 734 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005)
Dingman v. Harvell, 814 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)
State ex rel. Gerbitz v. Curridan, 738 S.W.2d 192 (Tenn. 1987)
Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co., 655 S.W.2d 146 (Tenn. 1983)
Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co., 621 S.W.2d 397 (Ten. Ct. App. 1981)
Description:
The Tennessee shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to
protect any information or the source of any information.431 The statute’s language
provides protection for traditional newsgatherers but also protects people who
independently gather information for publication or broadcast. This language could likely
protect non-traditional newsgatherers such as Internet media or authors. The Tennessee
appellate courts have not specifically addressed non-traditional newsgatherers, though.
The statute does not distinguish between confidential and non-confidential
information.432 A court can overturn the privilege if the person seeking the information
can show that the journalist has information clearly relevant to a probable violation of
law, the information is unavailable through other means, and the information is in the
compelling and overriding interest of the people of Tennessee.433 The Tennessee
appellate courts have interpreted the journalist’s privilege only through the state statute.
The courts have not found a basis for a journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment or
state constitution.
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Texas
State Shield Statute:
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 22.021 – 22.027 (2012) (shield in civil proceedings)
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.11 (2012) (shield in criminal proceedings)
State Cases Analyzed:
Nelson v. Pagan, 377 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App. 2012)
In re Rabb, 293 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. App. 2009)
In re Union Pacific R. Co., 6 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. App. 1999)
Coleman v. State, 966 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App., 1998)
Degarmo v. State, 922 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App. 1996)
Coleman v. State, 915 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App. 1996)
Dolcefino v. Ray, 902 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App. 1995)
State ex rel. Healy v. McMeans, 884 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
Dallas Morning News Co. v. Garcia, 822 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App. 1991)
Channel Two Television Co. v. Dickerson, 725 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App. 1987)
Ex parte Grothe, 687 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
Dallas Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Mouer, 533 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App. 1976)
Description:
Texas has two shield statutes that differ based on the type of proceeding.434 Both
statutes provide a qualified privilege to journalists. Both statutes grant protection for
journalists’ sources and unpublished information.435 Both statutes provide protection for
traditional journalists as well as journalists for Internet media, book authors, and
academics.436 Neither statute distinguishes between confidential and non-confidential
sources or information. The primary differences between the two statutes are the
processes for overturning the privilege. In civil proceedings, a court can overturn the
privilege if a party can show: 1) all reasonable efforts to obtain the information from
other sources have been exhausted; 2) the subpoenas is not overbroad, unreasonable, or
oppressive, and limited to the verification and accuracy of published information when
appropriate; 3) the party gave reasonable and timely notice to journalist of the demand for
information; 4) the party’s interest of need for information outweighs public interest in
the gathering and dissemination of news; 5) the subpoena or disclosure is not to obtain
peripheral, non-essential or speculative information; and 6) the information is relevant
and material to the administration of the proceeding and is essential to a claim or defense
of the party desiring the information.437 In criminal proceedings, the process to overturn
the privilege depends on the type of information sought. A court can overturn a
434

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.021 – 22.027 for civil proceedings; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 38.11 for criminal proceedings.
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TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.023; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART 38.11 § 3.
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TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.021; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART 38.11 § 1.
437
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.024.
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journalist’s privilege to protect confidential sources if a person desiring the testimony can
show that the journalist’s source committed a felony, confessed or admitted to the
commission of a felony, or probable cause exists that the source participated in a felony
criminal offenses. In each instance, the person seeking information must show that
reasonable efforts to obtain the information from other sources have been exhausted.438 A
court can also require a journalist to disclose information if it finds that the information
could be reasonably necessary to stop or prevent death or substantial bodily harm. A
court can overturn a journalist’s privilege to protect non-confidential sources or
unpublished information if the person seeking information can show that all reasonable
efforts to obtain information from other sources have been exhausted and the information
is relevant and material to a claim or defense, or is central to an investigation or
prosecution.439 The statute requires the court to consider multiple factors before
overturning the privilege.440 Finally, some Texas state appellate courts have found a basis
in the First Amendment for a qualified journalist’s privilege for confidential
information.441
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Utah
State Shield Statute:
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 509
State Cases Analyzed:
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege.
Description:
Utah’s state legislature has not enacted a shield statute. Rather, the Utah Supreme
Court adopted Rule 509 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which granted a qualified
journalist’s privilege.442 The privilege provides protection for journalists at newspapers,
magazines press associations, wire services, television stations or radio stations. The rule
grants journalists a privilege to protect confidential source information, confidential
unpublished news information, and other types of unpublished news information.
Depending on the type of information, the rule also requires courts to apply different
balancing tests to overturn the privilege. For confidential sources, a court must find that
the person wishing to overturn the privilege has provided clear and convincing evidence
that disclosure is necessary to prevent substantial injury or death. For confidential
unpublished information, a court must find that the person seeking information has
shown that the need for information outweighs the journalist’s continued interest in the
free flow of information. Also, journalists have a testimonial privilege for nonconfidential unpublished information if they can demonstrate that the continued need of
the free flow of information outweighs the need for disclosure.443 The Utah state
appellate courts have not specifically addressed rule 509. The courts have not addressed
journalist’s privilege generally. Utah falls under the United States Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit Court has used the First Amendment as a basis
for a qualified journalist’s privilege.444
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 509.
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Vermont
State Shield Statute:
Vermont does not have a state shield statute.
State Cases Analyzed:
Spooner v. Town of Topsham, 182 Vt. 328, 937 A.2d 641 (Vt. 2007)
In re Inquest Subpoena (WCAX), 179 Vt. 12, 890 A.2d 1240 (Vt. 2005)
State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974)
Description:
Vermont has not enacted a shield statute. The Vermont Supreme Court has used
the First Amendment as a basis for qualified journalist’s privilege in criminal
proceedings.445 The court granted the privilege to a television reporter, which likely
means most traditional journalists qualify for the privilege. Other state appellate courts
have not specifically addressed who is entitled to the privilege, though. The supreme
court has placed limits on the situations in which a journalist is entitled to First
Amendment protections.446 Specifically, the court refused to recognize a journalist
privilege in an inquest, which is equivalent to grand jury proceedings.447 The state
appellate courts have not addressed whether the privilege would apply in a civil context.
The supreme court specifically refused to provide protection for a journalist’s personal
observations at a public hearing.448
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State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974).
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Virginia
State Shield Statute:
Virginia does not have a state shield statute.
State Cases Analyzed:
Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974)
Description:
Virginia has not enacted a state shield statute. The Virginia state appellate courts
have addressed journalist’s privilege only once. The Virginia Supreme Court found a
basis in the First Amendment for a qualified journalist’s privilege to protect confidential
sources in criminal proceedings.449 The court provided a privilege to a newspaper
journalist, so other traditional journalists would likely receive protection. The supreme
court stated that a court should overturn the privilege if the journalist’s information was
essential for a trial to be fair. A court must examine the facts and circumstances of each
case to decide whether the information is essential.450 The state appellate courts have not
considered the privilege in other contexts. Some Virginia trial courts have considered the
privilege in a civil context, though.451
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Brown v. Com., 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974).
Id., at 431.
451
See Philip Morris Companies, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 36 Va. Cir. 1 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 1995); Clemente v. Clemente, 56 Va. Cir. 530 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2001).
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Washington
State Shield Statute:
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.68.010 (LexisNexis 2013)
State Cases Analyzed:
Olsen v. Allen, 42 Wash. App. 417, 710 P.2d 822 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)
State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wash. 2d 749, 689 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1984)
State v. Rinaldo, 36 Wash. App. 86, 673 P.2d 614 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)
Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98 Wash. 2d 638, 658 P.2d 641 (Wash. 1983)
Senear v. Daily Journal-American, a Division of Longview Pub. Co., 97 Wash. 2d 148,
641 P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1982)
Senear v. Daily Journal American, 27 Wash. App. 454, 618 P.2d 536 (Wash. Ct. App.
1980)
Description:
The Washington shield statute provides a qualified protection for journalists to
protect sources and information.452 Besides protecting traditional journalists, the statute
provides protection for book authors and journalists working for Internet-only news
media.453 The statute appears to apply to both confidential and non-confidential
information.454 The statute provides a two-step process for a court to overturn the
privilege. In a criminal investigation or prosecution, a party must first show through other
sources that reasonable grounds exist to believe that a crime has occurred. In a civil
action, a party must show a prima face cause of action through other sources of
information. A court can overturn the privilege in either a criminal or civil proceeding if a
party shows that the information is highly material and relevant, the information is
critical or necessary to the maintenance of a claim, defense or material issue, all other
sources have been exhausted, and compelling public interesting in disclosure exists.455
Washington state appellate courts have not interpreted the statute since it was enacted.
Prior to the statute, the Washington Supreme Court had recognized a common law
privilege in both criminal456 and civil contexts.457
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West Virginia
State Shield Statute:
W. Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-10 (LexisNexis 2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
State ex rel. Lincoln Journal, Inc. v. Hustead, 228 W. Va. 17, 716 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va.
2011)
State ex rel. Charleston Mail Ass’n v. Ransom, 200 W. Va. 5, 488 S.E.2d 5, (W. Va.
1997)
State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 182 W. Va. 500, 389 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 1989)
Description:
The West Virginia shield statute provides a near-absolute privilege for journalists
to protect confidential sources of information.458 The statute provides journalists
protection in any civil, criminal, administrative or grand jury proceeding in a court.459
The statute also protects any information that could possibly identify a confidential
source.460 The protection is near-absolute because court can require testimony only if the
journalist’s information is necessary to prevent imminent death, serious bodily injury, or
unjust incarceration.461 The statute has a broad definition of who is a journalist but does
require that journalism work make up a substantial portion of the person’s livelihood. The
statute does protect student journalists even if they are not compensated.462 In addition to
the statute, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has found the basis for a
qualified journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment and state constitution.463 The court
stated that the privilege applies to both sources and information whether confidential or
non-confidential.464 A court could overturn the privilege only after a party seeking the
information shows that the information is highly material and relevant, necessary or
critical to a claim, and unavailable from other sources.465
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Wisconsin
State Shield Statute:
Wis. Stat. § 885.14 (2012)
State Cases Analyzed:
Kurzynski v. Spaeth, 196 Wis. 2d 182, 538 N.W.2d 554 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)
State ex rel Green Bay Newspaper Co. v. Circuit Court, Branch 1, Brown County, 113
Wis. 2d 411, N.W.2d 367 (Wis. 1983)
Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978)
State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (Wis. 1971)
Description:
Wisconsin’s state shield statute provides an absolute privilege for journalists to
protect confidential sources and information.466 The statute also provides a qualified
privilege for journalists to protect non-confidential information.467 The privilege provides
protection for traditional news gatherers as well as book authors.468 The statute also
grants the privilege to a person who works for a business or organization that publishes
electronically.469 This language would likely protect Internet news media, but the
Wisconsin state appellate courts have not specifically addressed the issue. A circuit court
can issue a subpoena that requires a journalist to reveal non-confidential sources after
multiple steps. In a criminal prosecution or investigation, the person seeking information
must show that reasonable grounds exist to believe that a crime has been committed.470 In
a civil procedure, the person must show that the complaint states a claim which the
information could provide relief.471 A circuit court can issue a subpoena if it finds that the
requested information is highly relevant, necessary to the maintenance of a claim, defense
or issue, unavailable through other means, and disclosure is in the overriding public
interest.472 Before the statute was enacted, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the basis
for a qualified journalist’s privilege in the state constitution473 and in the First
Amendment for civil actions.474
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Wyoming
State Shield Statute:
Wyoming does not have a state shield statute.
State Cases Analyzed:
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege.
Description:
Wyoming does not have a state shield statute. The state appellate courts have not
addressed whether a journalist’s privilege exists under the First Amendment, state
constitution or common law. Wyoming falls under the United States Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals’ jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit Court has recognized a qualified journalist’s
privilege in the First Amendment.475 Journalists could potentially look to that court’s
decision as a basis for protection.
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